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I Introduction
While the Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have yet to
adopt affirmative labor and environmental obligations, the link between trade,
labor, and the environment has been pressed in much academic and policy
discourse.' Particularly with respect to environmental issues, the judicial body
of the WTO has been called on to identify some of the contours of appropriate
linkage between such "nontrade" issues and WTO rules in a series of closely-
watched disputes.2 The holdings of these cases have shifted since the WTO's
establishment in 1995, away from a deep suspicion about the propriety of
linking trade with nontrade issues, and towards a nuanced view that accepts the
validity of linkage as long as it meets certain formal parameters.
Some have applauded this shift, others have excoriated it. As the shape of
WTO jurisprudence on linkage has shifted, calls for resolution through political
negotiations have increased.3 Some perceive a "legislative" solution to offer
greater legitimacy because it would represent a more "democratic" solution
negotiated by the entire membership, rather than a rule adjudicated by a panel
1. See generally FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996); Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon! An
Interdisciplinary Approach, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 201 (1998); Symposium: The
Boundaries of the WTO, 96 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (Jose E. Alvarex ed.); Andrew Guzman,
Global Governance and the WTO (manuscript on file with author).
2. See infra Part Ill (describing the judicial branch's approach to enforcing WTO laws).
3. See infra Part IV (discussing how legislation should address the shifts in WTO
policies on linkage).
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of judges to resolve a dispute between particular members. Yet political
negotiations are fraught with a host of separate problems. What might be called
the "decision costs" of a legislative solution are high, possibly prohibitively 
so.4
A knotty problem arises for those concerned with linkage: there seems to be an
inverse relationship between perceived legitimacy, on the one hand, and
decision costs on the other. The expense of negotiating a specific rule, the
dangers of holdout and other strategic problems, and the specter of capture
might all render the legislative option unfeasible;' more seriously, they may
threaten the very legitimacy that the legislation solution purports to provide.
This Article considers the judicial and legislative responses to "the linkage
question" within the WTO. First, the Article recounts why the question has
arisen in the first place: the relative weakness of enforcement mechanisms
within international labor and environmental law.6 Second, the Article reviews
the range of WTO judicial responses to unilateral linkage efforts by member
states, considered under existing "negative" provisions of WTO law-a law of
exceptions that allows but does not mandate linkage.7 Third, the Article
considers the obstacles confronting the legislative response of defining the
relationship between trade, labor, and environmental policies through
multilateral negotiations to create "positive" labor and environmental
obligations within the WTO.8 Finally, the Article makes reference to a notably
successful effort at transitioning from negative exception to positive obligation:
the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs).9
The TRIPs Agreement indicates that the costs of legislation need not prohibit
successful negotiation; however, it also demonstrates that legislative outcomes
will not always foreclose legitimacy concerns.
II. International Labor and Environmental Law Enforcement Mechanisms
The problem at the center of the "trade linkage" question is the
discrepancy between enforcement in the WTO regime and enforcement in other
international legal regimes. This Part recounts the enforcement processes that
4. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42
VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001) (describing the transaction costs attendant to "prescriptive jurisdiction"
transactions).
5. See infra Part IV (examining the legislative option).
6. Infra Part 11.
7. Infra Part Ill.
8. Infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V (discussing TRIPS).
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have developed within international environmental and labor regimes and the
challenges these processes continue to face.
A. International Labor Law
Established in 1919,0 the International Labor Organization (ILO) has
established more than 180 binding conventions" and 190 nonbinding
resolutions, 12 on subjects ranging from human rights
3 to occupational safety.14
Despite one of the oldest pedigrees in international law, however, the ILO's
enforcement record has proved woeful.
An initial problem is that differing groups of countries have ratified
different treaties, creating a patchwork of inconsistent legal obligations
(although those conventions dealing with "core" labor standards tend to have
more uniform ratification).'" When a legal obligation does apply, moreover, the
10. CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, Treaty of Versailles,
June 28, 1919, Part XIII, 49 Stat. 2713, 225 Consol. T.S. 189, 373 [hereinafter ILO
Constitution].




13. See generally, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, adopted June 17, 1999, at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm (No. 182); Convention Concerning Minimum
Age Admission to Employment, adopted June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 (No. 138) (ILO)
[hereinafter Minimum Age Convention]; Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced
Labour, adopted June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (No. 105) (ILO) [hereinafter Abolition of
Forced Labour Convention]; Convention Concerning Freedom of Association & Protection of
the Right to Organize, adopted July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 (No. 87) (ILO) [hereinafter
Freedom of Association & Protection of the Right to Organize Convention].
14. E.g., Convention Concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the Working
Environment, adopted June 22, 1981, 1331 U.N.T.S. 279 (No. 155) (ILO) [hereinafter
Occupational Safety and Health Convention]; Convention Concerning Working Conditions in
Hotels, Restaurants, and Similar Establishments, adopted June 25, 1991, 1820 U.N.T.S. 445
(No. 172) (ILO) [hereinafter Working Conditions (Hotels & Restaurants) Convention];
Convention Concerning Labour Inspection in Agriculture, adopted June 25, 1969,812 U.N.T.S.
88 (No. 129) (ILO) [hereinafter Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention]; Convention
Concerning Food and Catering for Crews on Board Ship, adopted June 27, 1946, 164 U.N.T.S.
37 (No. 68) (ILO) [hereinafter Food & Catering (Ships' Crews) Convention].
15. The ratifications of "core" ILO agreements are as follows: The 1948 Freedom of
Association & Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, supra note 13, has been ratified
by 142 countries including Argentina, Austria, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe. The 1957 Abolition of
Forced Labour Convention, supra note 13, has been ratified by 161 countries, including
Argentina, Austria, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe. The 1973 Minimum Age Convention, supra note
13, has been ratified by 138 countries including Argentina, Austria, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.
The 1999 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, supra note 13, has been ratified by 145
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ILO's provisions for enforcement favor fact-finding and reporting over
sanctions.16 Although the ILO constitution authorizes sanctions in the event of
noncompliance, the language is vague: "In the event of any Member failing to
carry out within the time specified the recommendations... any other Member
may take against that Member the measures of an economic character
indicated.., as appropriate to the case."' 
7
As was the case with the trade regime prior to the WTO,'8 even with
respect to the most egregious labor practices, the ILO's enforcement capacity
has been severely constrained, as in the case of allegations of forced labor
practices in the country of Myanmar (known formerly as Burma).' 9 The
international outcry against Myanmar sparked a movement for economic
sanctions.2° This mobilization resulted in, among other things, the adoption of
countries, including Argentina, Austria, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe. The record for noncore
agreements is much different: The 1981 Occupational Safety and Health Convention, supra
note 14, has been ratified by thirty-nine countries, including Uruguay and Zimbabwe, but not
including Austria and Argentina. The 1991 Working Conditions (Hotels & Restaurants)
Convention, supra note 14, has been ratified by thirteen countries including Austria and
Uruguay, but not including Argentina and Zimbabwe. The 1946 Food & Catering (Ships'
Crews) Convention, supra note 14, has been ratified by twenty-four countries, including
Argentina, but not including Austria, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe. The 1969 Labour Inspection
(Agriculture) Convention, supra note 14, has been ratified by forty-one countries, including
Argentina, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe, but not Austria. The current lists of ratifications of these
conventions are found at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm (last visited Oct. 10,
2003).
16. Members are required to make annual reports as to their compliance with ILO
conventions to which they are parties. ILO Constitution, supra note 10, art. 408, 49 Stat. at
2725, 225 Consol. T.S. at 379. If a member fails to comply, the ILO can publicize that failure.
Id. art. 410, 49 Stat. at 2725, 225 Consol. T.S. at 380. A complaint can also be referred to a
Commission of Inquiry, which can investigate and make findings and recommendations. Id.
arts. 411-14,49 Stat. at 2725-28, 225 Consol. TS. at 380-81. A member may then choose to
pursue the matter further in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Id. arts. 415-18,49 Stat. at
2728-29, 225 Consol. T.S. at 381.
17. Id. art. 419, 49 Stat. at 2729, 225 Consol. T.S. at 382.
18. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 107-37 (1995) (comparing the
historical processes for enforcement of GATT agreements with the improved WTO process
implemented after the Uruguay Round).
19. See Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed Under Article 26 of the
Constitution of the International Labour Organization to Examine the Observance by Myanmar
of the Forced Labour Convention 1930 (No. 29), 102, ILO Official Bulletin v.81 1998 (Series
B, Special Supp.) (July 2, 1998) (describing allegations made by the ILO that the Myanmar
Government facilitated forced labor practices for both public and private purposes).
20. For a thorough account of the history and current status of the international sanctions
movement against Myanmar, see generally Altsean-Burma, Ready, Aim. Sanction! (Nov. 2003),
at http://www.altsean.org/ReadyAimSanction 112003.pdf. For a notable perspective on the
sanctions movement, see Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Forward, id. at I (comparing the possible
use of sanctions against Myanmar with those used against South Africa).
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procurement policies by several state and local governments in the United
States that penalized companies for doing business with Myanmar.2 1 Within
the ILO, noncompliance proceedings were triggered. As provided under the
ILO constitution, a coalition of twenty-five "Worker's delegates" from a cross-
section of developed and developing countries brought a formal complaint.23
The resulting Commission of Inquiry found extensive violations of the Forced
Labour Convention, amounting to "a saga of untold misery and suffering,
oppression and exploitation of large sections of the population inhabiting
Myanmar by the Government, military and other public officers., 24 The
Commission condemned the "impunity with which government officials, in
particular the military, treat the civilian population as an unlimited pool of
unpaid forced labourers and servants at their disposal.."25 To date, however,
Myanmar remains in noncompliance with the Convention, and the ILO has not
authorized any sanctions.
B. International Environmental Law
Lack of enforcement has also characterized international environmental
law. While the number and scope of multilateral environmental agreements
continue to grow, few institutional mechanisms have emerged for the effective
enforcement of environmental obligations.26 Rather, as one commentator has
described the situation:
21. See Paul Blustein, Thinking Globally, Punishing Locally: States, Cities Rush to
Impose Their Own Sanctions, Angering Companies and Foreign Affairs Experts, WASH. POST,
May 16, 1997, at G I (noting examples of states and municipalities refusing to purchase goods
from Myanmar); Robert S. Greenberger, States, Cities Increase Use of Trade Sanctions,
Troubling Business Groups and U.S. Partners, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1998, at A20 (same).
22. See Report of the Commission of Inquiry, supra note 19, at M 1,4 (documenting the
series of ILO complaints and criticisms preceding the filing of a formal complaint and reporting
on the action of the 267th meeting of the ILO Governing Body with respect to the filing of the
formal complaint).
23. Id. I n.l (listing the "Worker's delegates:" Lebanon, Ghana, Pakistan, France,
United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, Czech Republic, United States, Japan, Israel, Italy, Niger,
India, United Republic of Tanzania, Canada, Ireland, Venezuela, Malaysia, Tunisia, Mexico,
Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Barbados, and Poland).
24. Id. 543.
25. Id. 542.
26. See Johanna Rinceanu, Enforcement Mechanisms in International Environmental
Law: Quo Vadunt?, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 147, 148-49 (2000) (discussing enforcement of
international environmental law); see generally ULRICH BEYERLin & TWiLO MARAUHN, LAW-
MAKING AND LAW-ENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER THE 1992 Rio
CONFERENCE (1997) (discussing international environmental law).
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Frequently, there [is] a long lag in securing widespread ratification because
of insufficient incentives for nations to sign up .... Nor is there any
institutional mechanism to provide nations with incentives to comply when
they have ratified ....
The making and negotiation of the instruments themselves has to start anew
each time. No organization commands clear power to coordinate
international environmental negotiations. Each negotiation proceeds
differently ....
There is no institutional machinery to evaluate gaps that may be found in
the international framework of agreements or to develop means of assigning
priorities among competing claims for attention.27
In 1972, the foundational Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environmene 8 provided the basis for establishment
of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),29 which comes the
closest to a central agency responsible for international environmental law.
UNEP plays a "coordinating and catalytic role" but, at the same time, it "lacks
any formal powers. 30 It has no authority to require states to cooperate with its
efforts to gather information or to further the progressive development of
international environmental law. 1
27. Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 259, 263 (1992).
28. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted
June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14, reprinted in II I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration].
29. See G.A. Res. 2997, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972), reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 433 (1973) (establishing the United Nations Environment
Programme).
30. Palmer, supra note 27, at 260-61. Other agencies have also worked on parallel
tracks. For example:
[A]lthough the international community's emphasis during the 1970s was on
pollution of water, air, and soil, the International Union for Conservation of'Nature
and National Resources expanded the community's concern to endangered wildlife
and played a big part in negotiating the 1973 Washington Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.
Andronico 0. Adede, The Treaty System from Stockholm (1972) to Rio de Janeiro, 13 PAcE
ENVTL. L. R.v. 33, 36 n.17 (1995); see generally Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973,27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249,
993 U.N.T.S. 243, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1085 (1973).
31. Notwithstanding this lack of formal authority, the UNEP has succeeded in
encouraging states to negotiate new environmental treaties elaborating on such core principles
as marine conservation. See Adede, supra note 30, at 36 ("UNEP initiated its Regional Seas
Programme and negotiated a number of treaties.. . ."). Among other things, the UNEP
negotiated:
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Many calls have gone out to improve the institutional basis laid down by
the UNEP.32 Most significantly, in 1992 the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) undertook a major review and
[T]he 1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea
Against Pollution, the 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the
Protection of the Marine Environment From Pollution, the 1981 Abidjan
Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and
Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region, the 1981 Lima
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Areas of the
South-East Pacific, the 1982 Jeddah Regional Convention for the Conservation of
the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment, the 1983 Cartegena Convention for the
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean
Region, the 1985 Nairobi Convention for the Protection, Management and
Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African
Region, and the 1986 Noumea Convention for the Protection of the Natural
Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region.
Id. at 36-37. The UNEP's efforts have also proved key to the establishment of treaties on ozone
depletion. See Palmer, supra note 27, at 261 ("In my opinion, without UNEP, the system to
prevent ozone depletion now in place would not have been developed.").
32. In a document entitled the Hague Declaration on the Environment, several countries
called for "new and more effective decision-making and enforcement mechanisms." The Hague
Declaration on the Environment, done Mar. 11, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1308, 1309. In 1988, the
President of the World Federation of United Nations Associations proposed that a new mandate
be issued to the United Nations Trusteeship Council to protect the "planetary systems on which
our security and survival depends, as well as over the global commons." Durwood Zaelke &
James Cameron, Global Warming and Climate Change-An Overview of the International
Legal Process, 5 Am. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 249, 280 (1990) (quoting address by Maurice F.
Strong, National Conference on "Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Canada and the United
Nations," Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia, June 5, 1988, at 17 (on file at the office of the
American University Journal of International Law and Policy)). The World Commission on
Environment and Development, an expert group established by the United Nations, has called
for the establishment of a centralized mechanism headed by a United Nations High
Commissioner for the environment. Such a centralized mechanism would be responsible for
investigating and making reports on state compliance with core principles of international
environmental law. See THE WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OuR CoMMoN FruTRE 308-51
(1987) (suggesting the establishment of a mechanism for investigating and reporting on
compliance). More recently, commentators have called for the establishment of an International
Court for the Environment. See, e.g., Amedeo Postiglione, A More Efficient International Law
on the Environment and Setting Up an International Court for the Environment Within the
United Nations, 20 ENvTL. L. 321, 323 (1990) ("The creation of an International Court for the
Environment as part of the United Nations is urgently needed .... "). A number of other
international environmental scholars have also weighed in with their own proposals for a central
institution for the monitoring and enforcement of international environmental law. See Palmer,
supra note 27, at 278-82 (proposing an International Environment Organization); Rinceanu,
supra note 26, at 172-77 (proposing the redirection of existing institutions such as the United
Nations Security Council and the World Bank, as well as the creation of new institutions such as
a "Universal Court of Environment").
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expansion of international environmental law and sought to lay out a
comprehensive blueprint for its development and implementation.33
While many of the resulting documents were nonbinding, UNCED did
establish some binding treaties, an example of which is the Convention on
Biological Diversity.3 4 Although this Convention benefits from formally
binding status, many of its obligations are hortatory, qualified as they are by the
phrase "as far as possible and as appropriate."35 The Convention's institutional
mechanisms are sparse.36  In a communication to the World Trade
33. See generally GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW (Philippe Sands ed., 1993) (discussing
UNCED and the development of international environmental law). A few years prior to
UNCED's review, the U.N. General Assembly had set forth a framework, the System-Wide
Medium-Term Environment Programme, for the integration and implementation of international
environmental law. G.A. Res. 32/197, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/32/45 (1977); System-Wide Medium-Term Environment Programme for the Period 1990-
1995, U.N. Environment Programme, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/SS.I/7/Add. I (1988). Agenda 21 of
UNCED, for example, outlined an extensive set of recommendations for the institutionalization
of international environmental law. See Edith Brown Weiss, Introductory Note, United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, 31 I.L.M. 814, 814-15 (1992) (describing
Agenda 2 1).
34. Convention on Biological Diversity, done June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79,31 I.L.M.
818 [hereinafter Convention on Biological Diversity]. The Convention was negotiated out of a
separate initiative by the UNEP. See Proceedings of the Governing Council at its Fifteenth
Session, UNEP Governing Council, 15th Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 165-66, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/GC. 15/12 (1989) (authorizing an ad hoc working group to "negotiate an international
legal instrument for the conservation of the biological diversity of the planet").
35. Marc Pallemaerts, International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable
Development: A Critical Assessment of the UNCED Process, 15 J.L. & COM. 623, 660-61
(1996). Pallemaerts observes:
The Convention is no doubt legally binding, but is it any more "authoritative" than
[nonbinding statements], in the sense of imposing on the contracting parties precise
rules of conduct... ? Indeed, all of the substantive obligations of the parties
relating to the identification and monitoring of the elements of biological diversity
(Article 7); to in situ conservation (Article 8) and to ex situ conservation (Article
9); to sustainable use (Article 10); to incentives (Article 11) and to environmental
impact assessment (Article 14) are qualified by the phrase "as far as possible and as
appropriate."
Id. These would be called "illusory promises" in ordinary contract law.
36. The only regular institutional mechanism is that of regular meetings of the state
parties. See Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 34, art. 23, 1, 1760 U.N.T.S. at
157, 31 I.L.M. at 832 (establishing a conference of the parties that should hold regular
meetings). Implementation reports are called for, but there is no regular reporting requirement.
Rather, parties are to present reports "at intervals to be determined by the Conference of the
Parties." Id. art. 26, 1760 U.N.T.S. at 159, 31 I.L.M. at 834. This contrasts with the regular
reporting requirements laid down as part of the WTO. See Trade Policy Review Mechanism,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 3 [Treaties Binder 1, Treaties Booklet 3], L. & Prac.
World Trade Org. (Oceana) I (Mar. 1995) (defining the intervals for review of the trade policies
and practices of Members). For a brief description of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, see
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Organization, the Secretariat of the Convention conceded, "The Convention
does not have a compliance procedure. Formal assessment of Parties or non-
Parties compliance with the Convention has not occurred.
3 7
Perhaps the best institutionalized international environmental agreement is
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,38 because it
administers a fund to assist countries in achieving compliance. 39 The Montreal
Non-Compliance Procedure (NCP) 40 allows disputes between parties to be
submitted to an Implementation Committee, which then recommends
"appropriate action" to the parties.4 ' While the Implementation Committee
conducts extensive reporting of no compliance, it has not pursued sanctions
against noncompliant parties.42
Amelia Porges, Introductory Note, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral
Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, Annex III, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1129 (1994). A similar laxity characterizes the
Convention's dispute settlement provisions. The Convention allows, but does not require,
parties to submit a dispute to compulsory arbitration or compulsory submission to the
International Court of Justice. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 34, art. 27, 3,
1760 U.N.T.S. at 159, 31 I.L.M. at 834. If the parties have not both so agreed and cannot
otherwise agree on a dispute settlement process, the dispute is to be addressed through the
Convention's "conciliation" process. Id. art. 27, 4, 1760 U.N.T.S. at 160, 31 I.L.M. at 834.
This process results in a "proposal for resolution of the dispute, which the parties shall consider
in good faith." Id. Annex II, part 2, art. 5, 1760 U.N.T.S. at 169, 31 I.L.M. at 841.
37. Communication from the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity to the
Committee on Trade and the Environment, WT/CTE/W/I 16, 3 (June 28, 1999), available at
http://www.wto.org.
38. Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, openedfor signature Sept. 16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; see generally Elizabeth R. DeSombre,
The Experience of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly Remarkable, and Remarkably
Particular, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 49 (2000-2001) (discussing the success of the treaty
process used in ratifying the Montreal Protocol).
39. See DeSombre, supra note 38, at 70 (describing the Multilateral Fund).
40. The Montreal Protocol explicitly addressed the issue of enforcement by calling on the
parties to consider and approve enforcement mechanisms in the future. See Montreal Protocol,
supra note 38, art. 8, 26 I.L.M. at 1556 ("The Parties, at their first meeting, shall consider and
approve procedures and institutional mechanisms for determining noncompliance with the
provisions of this Protocol and for treatment of Parties found to be in noncompliance.").
41. See Communication from the Secretariat for the Vienna Convention and the Montreal
Protocol to the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment, WT/CTE/W/ 115, 17 (June
25, 1999) (UNEP) (stating that potential actions "include assistance, caution or suspension of
specified rights and privileges under the Protocol" and "[t]hat the measures for noncompliance
include assistance, on the assumption that a Party's noncompliance is not deliberate but only
due to its inability, is a novel provision introduced by the Parties to the Montreal Protocol"),
available at http://www.wto.org.
42. See id. 118 ("So far, only the case of the Russian Federation and other Republics of
the former Soviet Union are before the Committee for noncompliance, on the basis of the
Secretariat's report.").
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Overall, resources that exist for enforcement of international
environmental law, as with international labor law, remain sparse.43 It is
possible that the relative nonenforcement of these other regimes represents the
desire of states that these realms be relatively less authoritative, but rather serve
as communities in which norms evolve slowly over time. It is also possible that
the weakness of enforcement mechanisms in international labor and
environmental law is vestigial, representative of an earlier international arena in
which the technologies of enforcement were simply less well-developed. The
question of the legitimate scope of authoritativeness of international labor and
environmental rules has become more pressing as these regimes face a form of
regulatory competition from trade law.
III. The Judicial Branch Approach: Incorporation Through Interpretation?
The framework agreement of the WTO contains preanbular language that
affirms the importance of both labor and environmental protections. With
respect to the environment, as mentioned above, the WTO recognizes in its
preamble the importance of "expanding the production of and trade in goods
and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking... to
protect and preserve the environment."44 With respect to labor, the preamble
also recognizes that states' "relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
43. One patently frustrated nongovernmental organization (NGO) bemoaned an
"unfamiliar network of haphazardly coordinated [agencies] ... a fantasm, with mirage-like
powers, a creaking and fragmented process for deciding policy, and a surfeit of bureaucratic
fiefdoms that consistently muster inadequate resources to meet even the most urgent
challenges." UNITED NATIONS ASS'N OF THE U.S.A./THE SIERRA CLUB, UNITNG NATIONS FOR
THE EARTH: AN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA FOR THE WORLD COMMUNrrY 33 (1990). Another
commentator remarked, "The problem is that rhetoric about the environment is far easier to
produce than action, and international forums tend on occasion to degenerate into 'rhetoric-
fests,' where world leaders spout all the proper phrases but then go home and often fail to
implement their interationally-formulated promises." Ranee K.L. Panjabi, From Stockholm to
Rio: A Comparison of the Declaratory Principles of International Environmental Law, 21
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 215, 216 (1993).
44. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
pmbl. [Treaties Binder 1, Marrakesh Declaration Booklet], L. & Prac. World Trade Org.
(Oceana) 7, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (hereinafter WTO Agreement]. This formulation departs
notably from the stated objective of its predecessor, the GATT, to the unqualified "full use of
the resources of the world" unfettered by recognition of environmental constraints. General
Agreement in Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, pmbl., 61 Stat. Al 1, AI 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194,194
[hereinafter GAT 1947].
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ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand."45  Beyond stating these general principles,
however, the WTO Agreements do not contain affirmative obligations to
uphold labor and environmental standards. They do, however, create room for
states on their own to take measures that restrict trade in order to implement
social regulations.
A pivotal question in WTO jurisprudence is how much room exists under
these provisions. WTO members have pursued a host of claims testing WTO
law on some salient touchstones of the linkage debate. The WTO judiciary's
responses have come under fire from both sides of the debate-charged at once
with going too far to protect states' rights under nontrade law and not going far
enough.46 Some have charged the WTO Appellate Body with undue judicial
activism. 47  Others argue that WTO judges can and should allow states to
invoke international law to defend pro-labor or pro-environment trade
restrictions. 8  Examining WTO jurisprudence on some high-profile
controversies reveals a range of interpretive possibilities in the conflict between
trade rules and nontrade rules.
45. This language reproduces that of the 1947 GATT preamble. WTO Agreement, supra
note 44, pmbl. [Treaties Binder 1, Marrakesh Declaration Booklet], L. & Prac. World Trade
Org. (Oceana) at 7, 33 I.L.M. at 1144; GATT 1947, supra note 44, pmbl., 61 Stat. at A 11, 55
U.N.T.S. at 194. A contrarian might argue that labor protections create "rigidity" in the labor
market, preventing full employment, so that the preamble could be read to justify the rejection,
rather than the adoption, of labor protections. This familiar argument follows supply and
demand but is also qualified by key assumptions. In the case of a wage increase, for example,
one must assume that other variables remain constant, so that labor productivity does not
increase to offset the increase in production cost, and the employer cannot regain the increase in
production costs by increasing market prices. Note that this also assumes a competitive market,
which prevents the employer from being able to raise prices, and that the employer was
operating at a marginal labor product of zero. When the wage increases, employer demand for
labor will decrease (by the amount required for the employer to recover a marginal labor
product of zero). Consequently, although those employed will benefit from higher wages, the
overall number of employees will be fewer. However, the reference to raising standards of
living seems to make clear that what is sought is not simply full employment, but full
employment that improves quality of life.
46. See Susan Esserman & Robert Howse, The WTO on Trial, 82 FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb.
2003 at 130, 133-34 (discussing the positions taken by "antiglobalization advocates and
doctrinaire free traders" against judicial activism).
47. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Afierword: The Question ofLinkage, 96 Am. J. INT'L L. 126,
133-34 (2002) (stating that the WTO Appellate Board should avoid making drastic changes to
existing environmental laws).
48. See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law: How Far Can We Go?,
95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535,566 (2001) (arguing that disputing parties should be allowed to invoke
international laws found in sources outside of the WTO).
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A. The General Exceptions ofArticle XK
The most prominent set of labor and environmental allowances is found in
Article XX of the GAT'r. 49  Entitled "General Exceptions," Article XX
recognizes that the social regulation objectives of governments may lead them
to take measures that restrict trade in a way that contravenes other GATT
rules.50 Article XX permits such measures if they survive a designated test.
The Article XX test requires that the measure in question possess two qualities:
first, it is demonstrably germane to the stated social objective; and second, it
does not abuse basic GATT/WTO principles of nondiscrimination. The
measure cannot be "applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade."5' This
condition is referred to as the "chapeau" because of its location in an
introductory paragraph that sits atop several brief subclauses.
The second objective is met by incorporating language that the measure at
issue be in a defined nexus with the social objective-either "related to" or
"necessary to." s2 Relevant provisions here include those allowing measures that
49. See GATi 1947, supra note 44, art. XX, 61 Stat. at A60-63, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262
(outlining the exceptions that derive from member states' police powers).
50. The full relevant text of Article XX reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
l.(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health ....
(e) relating to the products of prison labour ....
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures




52. Id. Some provisions contain different "nexus" requirements, but these provisions
relate to other types of objectives not relevant here. See, e.g., id. art. XX, para. l(f), 61 Stat. at
A6 1, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262 (allowing measures "imposed for the protection of national treasures of
artistic, historic or archaeological value"); id. art. XX, para. 1(h), 61 Stat. at A6 1, 55 U.N.T.S. at
264 (allowing measures "undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental
commodity agreement").
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are "necessary to protect public morals, 5 3 "necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health,0 4 "relating to the products of prison labour,""s and
"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures




On the environmental side, the "animal or plant life or health" and
"conservation of exhaustible natural resources" are pointed to as providing the
basis for incorporation of environmental standards into the WTO by exempting
measures taken to meet these objectives. This text has generated a number of
interpretations, which will be discussed from the least receptive to linkage to
the most receptive.
a. Tuna-Dolphin Case
In the 1993 Tuna-Dolphin Case, the United States Marine Mammal
Protection Act prohibited the import of tuna that was produced in a way that
was not "dolphin-safe."07 Mexico challenged the provision on the grounds that
its tuna exporters were adversely affected. The Panel found that the measure




57. See Dispute Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept 3, 1991,
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155, 2.3 (1993) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin Case] (discussing U.S.
restrictions on tuna imports). The Tuna-Dolphin Case was brought under the pr-WOdispte settlenmt
framework. The panel report was not adopted because the United States voted against it See Howse,
infra note 67, at 493 n.8 (explaining that before the establishment of the WTO, panel rulings had to be
adopted by all the member states in order to become binding). It established an interpretive framework,
however, which served as a departure point for WO decisions.
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violated the GATT's prohibition on import restrictions" and that it was not
exempted under Article XX.
59
The Tuna-Dolphin Panel suggested that there was very little use for
Article XX in regulating activity outside a state's own borders.6 The Panel
expressed a concern in particular that measures adopted by one government that
seek to control production methods in another territory would constitute a brand
of unilateralism that would jeopardize the multilateral framework established
by the GATT.6' Thus, the Panel held that a government could only use Article
XX to impose trade restrictions that addressed the content of the product
themselves (the "product" as opposed to the "process"), and therefore
constituted direct threats to residents of the government's territory.62 The Panel
strongly suggested that Article XX could not be used to justify the unilateral
adoption by states of measures that sought to affect behavior extraterritorially.
63
States could only adopt such cross-border environmental measures through
explicit multilateral action.64
This "anti-unilateral" result follows in part from the Panel's assertion that
such state practices would conflict with the central trade-liberalizing principles
of the WTO. While these central principles were to be interpreted broadly,
Article XX exceptions were to be construed narrowly so as to impede trade
liberalization as little as possible.65  Thus, the Panel held that the term
"necessary" in XX(b)'s phrase "necessary to protect animal or plant life or
health" required that the measure in question be the least trade-restrictive
58. GAT 1947, supra note 44, art XI, 61 Stat. at A32, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224-28. Article XI is a
prohibition on quantitative import restrictions. It provides, in part, that "[n]o prohibitions or restrictions
other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses
or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the temitory of any other contracting party." Id art XI, 1,61 Stat. at A32,55 U.N.T.S. at
224-26. This prohibition expresses the GAT policy preference that ifgovemnents must resaict imports,
they do so through specific monetmry charges rather than physical restrictions.
59. SeeTuna-Dolphin Case, supra note 57, In 5.22-6.4 (noting that Article XX did notjustifythe
provisions of the United States Maxine Mammal Protection Act).
60. See id. 5.27 ("The Panel considered that if the broad interpretation of Article XX(b)
suggested by the United States were accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally
determine the life or health protection policies from which other contracting parties could not
deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement.").
61. Id.
62. See id. (stating that Article XX(b) should not be interpreted to allow "each contracting
party... [to] unilaterally determine the life and health protection policies" of the other
contracting parties).
63. See id. (same).
64. See id. (same).
65. See id. 5.28 (determining that the measure taken by the United States was not
"necessary within the meaning of Article XX(b)").
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measure available.66 One might view the Panel's approach as a "strict scrutiny"
approach for measures that restrict trade to promote social regulations.67
b. Clean Air Act Case
In the 1996 Clean Air Act Case, Venezuela and Brazil challenged U.S.
clean air legislation imposing emissions requirements on all refined gasoline
consumed in the United States.6' The challenge asserted that the United States
measure favored domestic producers by allowing those producers more ways to
comply with emissions requirements than foreign producers. 69 The United
States did not challenge the assertion that this difference in available
compliance methods conferred a disadvantage on foreign producers, but rather
argued that Article XX saved the violation.70
66. "Article XX is a limited and conditional exception from obligations under other
provisions of the General Agreement, and not a positive rule establishing obligations in itself.
Therefore, the practice of panels has been to interpret Article XX narrowly.... ." GATT
Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS2I/R-
39S/155, 5.22 (Sept. 3, 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594.
67. See Robert Howse, Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp- Turtle Case: A New Legal
Baselinefor the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491, 501 (2002) ("In
previous GAfljurisprudence, 'necessary' had been interpreted as triggering a very high level
of scrutiny: a measure could only pass muster if it used the least restrictive means to achieve its
end."). For a comparison of WTO jurisprudence to U.S. Supreme Court constitutional
jurisprudence including the "strict scrutiny" standard, see Sheila Foster & Ari Afilalo, The
World Trade Organization's Anti-Discrimination Jurisprudence: Free Trade, National
Sovereignty, and Environmental Health in the Balance, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2003) (manuscript on file with author); John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian,
The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511 (2000). For discussions of a "strict
scrutiny" approach in other domains of WTO jurisprudence, see Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz,
WTO Case Review 2002,20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 143, 178; Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden
Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions,
34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 109, 159 (2002).
68. WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996), reprinted in 35 1.L.M. 274 (1996)
[hereinafter Clean Air Case Panel Report], available at http://www.wto.org; WTO Appellate
Body Report on United States Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R, at 29 (May 20, 1996) (modifying the Dispute Panel's report), reprinted in 35
I.L.M 603, 633 (1996) [hereinafter Clean Air Act Case Appellate Body Report], available at
http://www.wto.org.
69. See Clean Air Act Case Panel Report, supra note 68, 3.12 (stating that the measure
treated foreign refiners less favorably than U.S. refineries).
70. See id. 3.37 .(noting that "if the [Dispute] Panel found the Gasoline Rule was
consistent with" Article III of GAIT 1947, it did not have to address the Article XX
exceptions).
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Although it emphasized that its decision against the United States should
not be taken as a condemnation of environmental policy, 7' the Panel applied a
reading of XX(g) ("relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources") that seemed to mirror the "strict scrutiny" approach of the Tuna-
Dolphin reading of XX(b) ("necessary for the protection of animal or plant life
or health"). 72 The Panel held that the U.S. measure was WTO-inconsistent
because there were alternative means of achieving the environmental goal that,
although more costly to implement, were nonetheless "reasonabl[y]
available.
7 1
The Appellate Body (AB) reversed the Panel report's reasoning, though
not its result. In so doing, the AB revamped the Tuna-Dolphin approach. The
AB began by loosening the test for applying XX(g), finding that the XX(g)
term "relating to" set a lower bar than the "necessary to" language under
XX(b).74 This move potentially expanded the substantive zone for WTO-
consistent environmental measures. In applying the Article XX chapeau, the
AB focused on the language of the chapeau that requires that trade-restricting
social measures not constitute "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable" discrimination or a
"disguised restriction" on international trade.75 It found that this language
required governments to ensure, prior to imposing unilateral trade-restrictive
social measures, that there were no other reasonably available measures to
them.76 The AB then rejected U.S. arguments that justified the stricter rules for
foreign refiners on the basis of greater enforcement-costs, and an unsuccessful
attempt at bilateral negotiation.77
71. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Case Panel Report, supra note 68, 7.1 ("In concluding, the
Panel wished to underline that it was not its task to examine generally the desirability or
necessity of the environmental objectives of the Clean Air Act or the Gasoline Rule."). The
panel of the Shrimp-Turtle I case discussed below made a similar declaration.
72. See Clean Air Act Case Appellate Body Report, supra note 68, at 16,35 I.L.M. at 620
("In other words, the Panel Report appears to have applied the 'necessary' test not only in
examining the baseline establishment rules under Article XX(b), but also in the course of
applying Article XX(g).").
73. Clean Air Act Case Panel Report, supra note 68, M 6.26-6.28.
74. See Clean Air Act Case Appellate Body Report, supra note 68, at 17-18,35 I.L.M. at
621-22 (explaining that the different terms used in Article XX do not require "the same kind or
degree of connection or relationship between the measure under appraisal and the state interest
or policy sought to be promoted or realized").
75. See id. at 22-29, 35 I.L.M. at 626-33 (noting that the U.S. measure did not consider
costs for foreign refiners to comply with statutory baselines).
76. See id. at 26, 35 I.L.M. at 631 (analyzing less trade-restrictive alternatives).
77. Id. at 28, 35 I.L.M. at 632. The Appellate Body stated:
We have.., located two omissions [by] the United States: to explore adequately
means, including in particular cooperation with the governments of Venezuela and
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By endorsing the desirability of environmentally conscious policy and by
adopting a relatively generous reading of Article XX(g), the Clean Air Act AB
Report may be read to shift subtly but definitively away from the strongly
suspicious outlook of Tuna-Dolphin. A pro-environment critique of the report,
on the other hand, might find the relaxation of Article XX(g) superficial: the
AB arguably incorporated into Article XX's chapeau the strict scrutiny-type
"least restrictive means" analysis it had rejected in the context of sub-clause
XX(g). 71 Critics of this result worried that the Article XX interpretation
adopted by the Appellate Body would allow it to quash any measure that did
not mesh with the "preferred" approach conjured up, in the abstract and in
hindsight, in the context of a WTO dispute.79
c. Shrimp-Turtle I
The tug-of-war continued in the Shrimp-Turtle I Case, s° in which the
WTO faced facts similar to those of the Tuna-Dolphin Case.8" At issue was a
U.S. measure prohibiting the import of shrimp produced in a way that harmed
Brazil, of mitigating the administrative problems relied on as justification by the
United States for rejecting individual baselines for foreign refiners; and to count the
costs for foreign refiners that would result from the imposition of statutory
baselines.
Id.
78. See id. at 16, 35 I.L.M. at 620 (finding that no Article XX exception applies), The
Panel found the U.S. measure inconsistent with the GATTIWTO, although on different grounds.
In particular, the Panel adopted a stricter interpretation of both "necessary" for the protection of
plant, animal or human life or health, and "relating to" the conservation of natural resources.
See Clean Air Act Case Panel Report, supra note 68, 6.20-6.41 (construing strictly the word
"necessary" in Article XX). On appeal by the United States, the Appellate Body rejected this
strict interpretation of the Article XX subclauses, shifting its strict scrutiny of the measure to its
compliance with the Article XX chapeau. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text
(discussing application of Article XX "chapeau" to U.S. measures). Although the rationale was
different, the Appellate Board confirmed the ultimate conclusion of the Panel that the U.S.
measure was inconsistent with GATT/WTO law. See Clean Air Act Case Appellate Body
Report, supra note 68, at 29 (affirming in part the Dispute Panel's report).
79. See Martin A. McCrory & Eric L. Richards, Clearing the Air: The Clean Air Act,
GA 7Tand the WTO's Reformulated Gasoline Decision, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1,43-
44 (1998-1999) (noting that the Appellate Board "applied a very strict version of a least
restrictive approach").
80. For a nuanced discussion of the Shrimp-Turtle cases, see Howse, supra note 67.
81. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 5-8 (Oct. 12, 1998) reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 118
[hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle I Appellate Body Report] (regarding a prohibition by the U.S. on the
importation of shrimp whose harvesting endangers sea turtles), available at http://www.wto.org.
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endangered sea turtles.82 The initial disposition of the case did not bode well
for environmentalists. Although the Panel once again hastened to disavow
any opposition to the environmental objective at issue,83 it set a high bar for
the pursuit of environmental objectives in a WTO-consistent fashion. In
particular, the Panel seemed to revive and reinforce the strong anti-unilateral
approach of the Tuna-Dolphin decisions.8 4 The Panel expressed strong
concerns that allowing members to condition market access on the importing
country's conservation policies would lead to a proliferation of conflicting
measures that would undermine the "security and predictability" of the
multilateral trading system.85 The Panel reinforced these concerns by finding
that multilaterally negotiated environmental policies were emphatically
preferred to unilateral policies.8 6 Relatedly, the Panel rejected the United
States' argument that its policy implemented multilateral environmental
objectives, finding that although a number of multilateral environmental
agreements recognized the principle of wildlife conservation, these
agreements did not provide for the specific measures required by the United
States. 7
From an environmentalist point of view, the Panel's insistence on
specific authorization of the measure in question by a multilateral instrument
was worrisome. International environmental law, at least as currently
composed, tends to articulate broad principles rather than concrete
compliance measures. A multilateralism requirement runs the risk of
imposing a Catch-22: the measure is invalid unless it derives directly from a
multilateral instrument, but the very weakness of such instruments is what
necessitates the unilateral adoption of specific implementation measures. For
82. See id. at 4-5 (describing the dispute over shrimp harvesting).
83. GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States--mport Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, 37 I.L.M. 832, 9 8.2 (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle I Panel
Report].
84. In the panel's view, if an interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX were to be
followed which would:
[A]llow a Member to adopt measures conditioning access to its market for a given product upon
the adoption by the exporting Members of certain policies,.. . the WTO Agreement could no
longer serve as a multilateral framework for trade among Members as security and predictability
of trade relations under those agreements would be threatened .... Market access for goods
could become subject to an increasing number of conflicting policy requirements for the same
product and this would rapidly lead to the end of the WTO multilateral trading system.
Id. $ 7.45.
85. Id. 97.44.
86. See id. 7.50, 7.52 (addressing the United States's arguments in support of its
unilateral trade restriction).
87. Id. 1 7.57, 7.58.
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example, in the Shrimp-Turtle I Case, the United States could point to several
instruments that stressed the importance of protecting sea turtles.88 It could
point to none, however, that imposed specific obligations to that end. 9 The
United States argued that its measure was validly rooted in the principles
established by these agreements. 90
As it had in previous cases, the Appellate Body reversed the more
strictly anti-environmental elements of the Panel's reasoning in the Shrimp-
Turtle I Case, although it upheld the Panel's conclusion. Most notably, the
AB rejected the sweeping language related to unilateral measures by states
intending to regulate extraterritorial environmental practices.9 The Appellate
Body found that "[s]uch an interpretation renders most, if not all, of the
specific exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the principles
of interpretation we are bound to apply."92
Instead of broadly condemning unilateral measures, the Appellate Body
focused more tightly on whether the United States implemented its unilateral
measure in a discriminatory manner, concentrating again on the language of
the Article XX chapeau. The Appellate Body found that the United States
had failed to show that it had imposed the import ban in a way that did not
discriminate among member states. 9a The United States imposed the import
88. See Shrimp-Turtle 1 Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, 132 (noting the
importance of protecting living natural resources).
89. See id. 166 (noting the lack of international agreements for the protection and
conservation of sea turtles).
90. See id. 23 (arguing that the rule was a bona fide conservation measure). Those
agreements included the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals, June 23, 1979, 19 1.L.M. 15; the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 34;
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. A
commentator has surmised:
The unilateral effort of the United States is not the sole attempt at protecting sea
turtles. A number of international agreements have entered into force which in
effect should protect the sea turtles. The application and enforcement of these
agreements is often difficult at best and impossible at worst. The efficacy of these
agreements have come into question. No international treaties specifically call for
the use of TEDs despite the efforts of the Department of State required by Section
609. Instead, many international agreements utilize broad provisions which may
(or may not) be interpreted to obligate states to protect sea turtles through domestic
regulations.
Matthew Brotmann, The Clash Between the WTO and the ESA: Drowning a Turtle to Eat a
Shrimp, 16 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 345-46 (1999).
91. See Shrimp-Turtle I Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, T 133 (finding a
"sufficient nexus" between certain marine populations and the United States).
92. Id. 121.
93. See id. $ 173 (finding that the United States discriminated among member countries).
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ban on the complainant states much more rapidly and with less consultation
than a group of states in Latin American and the Caribbean.94 The United
States had negotiated a multilateral agreement with Latin American states
regarding sea turtle conservation, but had failed to do the same for other
importing states. 95 The Appellate Body concluded that although unilateral
measures were not per se inconsistent with the WTO, the discrepancy in the
U.S. negotiating overtures towards different groups of states rendered the
implementation of its unilateral measure unjustifiably discriminatory under
the Article XX chapeau.96
Environmentalists roundly criticized the Clean Air Act and Shrimp
Turtle I rulings as sharp blows to the cause of world conservation.97 More
recently, however, commentators have defended the approach as essential to
the anti-discriminatory principles that frame the GATT/WTO system.9 In
each case, after all, there seemed to be a measure that clearly disadvantaged
foreign producers. A more charitable view of the GATT/WTO framework is
that, while it accepts the possibility of environmental and labor measures, it
insists that the principle of nondiscrimination cannot be a casualty.
Otherwise, such measures run a greater risk of serving purely politically
expedient ends. In the Clean Air Act Case, for example, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) may have chosen to "externalize" compliance costs
onto foreign producers in order to ease the way for domestic producers to
comply and therefore ease domestic political opposition. Similarly, in the
Shrimp-Turtle I Case, foreign producers may have borne the brunt of a
politicized regulatory process.99
Moreover, although the Appellate Body ultimately found the U.S.
measure WTO-inconsistent, it rejected the strictly anti-unilateral orientation
of the Panel. Because the United States lost the case, the importance of this
jurisprudential shift was not immediately obvious. The shift would bear fruit,
however, in the follow-up case: Shrimp-Turtle II.
94. See id. (describing the discriminatory nature of the timeline).
95. See id. (noting the exemptions granted Latin American countries).
96. Id. 161--69.
97. See Lopi WALLACH & MICHELLE SFORZA, WHOSE TRADE ORGANiZATION? CORPORATE
GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY 57-64 (1999) (noting that WTO rulings
require countries to perform complex procedural inquiries and costly tests before they can adopt
measures in response to identified health risks).
98. Foster & Afilalo, supra note 67; McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 67, at 519.
99. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 67, at 521-25 (assessing the pressure of
interest groups on the WTO).
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d. Shrimp-Turtle II
In this case, Malaysia challenged the new measures the United States had
put into place to implement the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) findings under
Shrimp-Turtle I. Shrimp-Turtle H tested two of the potential implications of
Shrimp-Turtle I found most objectionable by environmentalists: that a member
could adopt a unilateral approach only after exercising a "duty to negotiate
seriously" a multilateral solution; and, relatedly, that any unilateral measure
must directly implement an explicit multilateral directive. One can read the
Shrimp-Turtle II holding to renounce both of these interpretations of the earlier
Appellate Body decision. Rather than insisting on a "duty to negotiate
seriously," Shrimp-Turtle I "suggests that if a Member has adequately
accounted for different conditions in different countries, then whether that
country has engaged in negotiation may be irrelevant for purposes of the
chapeau."'00 Moreover, "the international environmental instruments cited by
the Appellate Body" in resolving the case "clearly anticipatef that there will be
solutions where it will not be possible to avoid unilateralism."'0 '
2. Labor Measures
Apart from language in the preamble affirming "full employment" and
"raising standards of living," WTO law contains no provisions that set out
affirmative labor standards. 10 2 As with environmental standards, the potential
100. Howse, supra note 67, at 509.
101. ld.atlO.
102. The international trade regime initially envisioned after World War II would have
explicitly incorporated labor standards. See Havana Charter for an International Trade
Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, art. 7, Dep't St. Pub. No. 3117, Apr. 1947, at 7 ("The Members
recognize that unfair labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties
in international trade, and, accordingly, each Member shall take whatever action may be
appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its territory."). That movement
failed, and U.S. proposals for inclusion of labor standards in the GAT'T regime that ultimately
developed apparently failed to win the approval of the other contracting parties. See Addle
Blackett, Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty Interpretation, 31
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 8 n.14 (1999) (quoting an informal proposal put forth by the
United States to achieve fair labor standards as part of GATI); see also Janelle M. Diller &
David A. Levy, Notes and Comments, Child Labor, Trade and Investment: Toward the
Harmonization of International Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 663, 685-86 (1997) (discussing the
failure to gain support for labor standards because of the difficulty of defining unfair
competition). The issue arose periodically in subsequent GATT negotiation rounds, especially
the Tokyo Round, which was the last before the GATT transformed into the WTO. See Clyde
Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 61, 62-63 (2001) (discussing the history of failed efforts to include labor
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for recognition comes mainly via exemption. Article XX sets out several
clauses that might be considered to include labor standards, most explicitly, the
provision that allows members to maintain measures that are otherwise WTO-
inconsistent if they "relat[e] to the products of prison labour."'0 3 Article XX
also contains more general clauses that could be applibd to uphold labor
standards. Article XX(a) provides an exemption for measures that are
"necessary to protect public morals," and Article XX(b) allows for measures
that are "necessary to protect animal or plant life or health."' °4 All of these
clauses are subject to the chapeau's conditions relating to arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination or disguised protection.
An early case, Belgian Family Allowances, suggested that differences in
labor standards violate the trade regime's basic principles offnondiscrimination. 1
However, Belgian Family Allowances did not discuss the applicability of
Article XX's exceptions. Robert Howse has ventured that, in the contemporary
context, the "public morals" exception of Article XX(a) could allow for such
measures within the conditions established by the Article XX chapeau:
[T]here is an argument that the interpretation of public morals should not
be frozen in time and that with the evolution of human rights as a core
element in public morality in many post-war societies, the content of public
morals extends to include disapprobation of labor practices that violate
universal human rights."°
6
Howse's premise finds support in Joost Pauwelyn's contention that WTO rules
must be read in conjunction with the larger body of public international law.'0 7
B. The SPS Agreement
Although the WTO has declined to take social regulations head on, it has
expanded to make that collision inevitable. During the Uruguay Round,
members negotiated the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
standards in the GATT negotiations).
103. GATT art. XX(e).
104. Id. art. XX(a)-(b).
105. Belgian Family Allowances, Nov. 7, 1952, GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 59 (1953)
(finding that a Belgian measure that imposed a tax on government-procured imports from
countries without a system of public allowances violated the Most-Favored Nation Treatment
rule of Article i).
106. Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights,
3 J. SMALL& EMERGING Bus. L. 131,192 (1999).
107. Pauwelyn, supra note 48, at 560.
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(the SPS Agreement), which sought to create guidelines for the establishment
of consumer health and safety regulations relating to imports.108 The SPS
Agreement expands upon GATT 1947 Article XX, paragraph I(b) by providing
that "[m]embers have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures
necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health."' 9 It
further elaborates that "[m]embers shall ensure that any sanitary or
phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence."" 0
Viewed from one perspective, the SPS Agreement enables social
regulation of trade; it seems to imply that if a country follows the SPS
Agreement, its social regulations will be free from challenge under the
GATT/WTO. Critics of the SPS Agreement, however, argue that the SPS
Agreement imposes pressure on governments to reduce or weaken their social
regulatory framework."' This difference of opinion was never as visible as
during the recent WTO dispute in which Canada and the United States brought
a complaint against the European Community (EC), challenging the EC's
import ban on beef produced with artificial growth hormones." '
The so-called Beef Hormone Case became a lightning rod for concerns
about the proper role of international trade law in constraining the social
regulatory arm of member states." 3 The EC argued that the import ban was
108. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Annex IA [Treaties Binder I, Treaties
Booklet 1], L. & Prac. World Trade Org. (Oceana) 59, 59 (Mar. 1995) [hereinafter SPS
Agreement] (recognizing the significance of sanitary and phytosanitary measures for health and
trade).
109. Id. at 60.
110. Id.
Ill. See, e.g., WALLACH & SFORZA, supra note 97, at 59-61 (recognizing that because the
SPS Agreement only permits measures based on "sound science," nations may be forced to
ignore their cultural values).
112. GATT Appellate Body Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), 2 (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Beef Hormone Appellate Body Report] (stating
that the EC measures were inconsistent with the SPS Agreement), http://www.wto.org.
113. The European Parliament expressed vocal concern about the decision. See, e.g.,
Dagmar Roth-Behrendt, Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy,
European Parliament, Opinion on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and
the European Parliament on the EU Approach to the WTO Millennium Round (COM (1999))
331 ("[T]he Beef-hormone example demonstrates how the existing system is geared towards
trade concerns. It does not adequately respect the right of nations to take a different approach-
tending to favour the vendor rather than the consumer."). For an American perspective that is
equally critical, see WALLACH & SFORZA, supra note 97, at 59-61 (lamenting the shift of health
policy-making authority from elected officials to the WTO).
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imposed strictly in the interests of EC consumers." 4 The complainants argued
that the import ban played on consumer fears to justify protectionist measures
that only benefited EC producers." 5
In the resolution of the dispute, the conflict between WTO law, as
currently interpreted, and other realms of international law came into stark
relief. The EC justified its "zero tolerance" approach to artificial growth
hormone in beef by reference to the "precautionary principle.""' 6 The
precautionary principle of international environmental law' holds that if little
is known about the health implications of a particular product or process,
governments are justified in imposing very strict regulations as a precaution.
The Appellate Body ultimately rejected the EC's interpretation of the
precautionary principle." 8 The AB was careful to emphasize that its
interpretation of the SPS agreement did not bar Member states from
establishing levels of protection that were more restrictive than predominant
scientific opinion might warrant. The Appellate Body did find, however, that
when a Member chose to establish a higher level of protection, a "risk
assessment" that was based on scientific research was required to support it;
invocation of the precautionary principle without such scientific support failed
to meet the risk assessment requirement.' 19
C. Social Regulation or Disguised Protectionism? The Interpretive
Dilemma and Challenges to Judicial Legitimacy
In the range of cases on social measures that have come before the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism, few have survived. A careful reading of the
Appellate Body opinions shows that in many cases it took issue not with the
114. See Beef Hormone Appellate Body Report, supra note 112, 16 (arguing that the SPS
agreement allows members to be cautious with health issues).
115. See id. 78 (noting Canada's argument that protective measures must be accompanied
by scientific evidence).
116. See id. 16 (arguing that the precautionary principle allows for protective measures).
117. See, e.g., Gregory D. Fullem, Comment, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental
Protection in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 495, 520-22 (1995)
(encouraging the expansion of the precautionary principle); Bernard A. Weintraub, Note,
Science, International Environmental Regulation, and the Precautionary Principle: Setting
Standards and Defining Terms, I N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 197-204 (1992) (proposing that the
precautionary principle furthers the goals of justice and equity).
118. See Beef Hormone Appellate Body Report, supra note 112, 125 (finding that the
precautionary principle does not override the SPS Agreement).
I 19. See id. 194 (stating that a risk assessment need not reach a "monolithic conclusion,"
but must take into account all considerations).
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (2004)
measure itself, but with the means by which that measure was implemented,
calling for a process that was either less discriminatory or better supported by
scientific evidence. Nevertheless, for many labor and environmental advocates,
these outcomes suggested that reform was needed to strike a better balance
between trade concerns and "trade-related" social concerns. Ironically, from
other quarters, the Appellate Body attracted criticism for being too generous to
the concerns of labor and environmental advocates. After Shrimp-Turtle II's
approval of the modified U.S. measure protecting sea turtles, some trade
analysts pronounced the Appellate Body captured by "the persistent
environmental lobbies of the North."0
20
The criticism directed towards the Appellate Body indicates the dilemmas
it faces in balancing the trade principles of the WTO with social concerns that
are both policy objectives of WTO Members and principles of international
labor and environmental law. Some scholars argue that WTO law must be read
in conjunction with these latter principles.' 21  Others worry that such
consideration strains the legitimacy of the Appellate Body as a body charged
with applying WTO law.
122
An underlying controversy on the boundary between legitimate social
regulation and illegitimate protectionism changes the debate over the propriety
of judicial resolution of the linkage issue.123 If one believes in the benefits of
trade and the difficulty of convincing governments to lower barriers, the
rationale for this suspicion gains some validity. With a deep suspicion of the
protectionist impulses of governments in mind, the import-restricting measures
relating to tuna, shrimp, refined gasoline, and beef all begin to look like poorly
disguised concessions to domestic industries seeking to stave off outside
competition to the detriment of consumers and ultimately to the detriment of
aggregate global welfare.
Public choice literature reminds us that it is quite possible-and, under
certain conditions, likely-for governments to cater to narrow protectionist
interests at the expense of the wider population.124 An insistently rosy view of
the motives of governments, therefore, is not particularly appropriate. The
concern about disguised protectionism is a valid one.
120. E.g., Bhagwati, supra note 47, at 133.
121. Pauwelyn, supra note 48, at 560.
122. Guzman, supra note 1.
123. Robert E. Hudec, Science and "Post-Discriminatory" WTO Law, 26 B.C. [NT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 185, 190 (2003).
124. For surveys of public choice literature, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PIuLI" P.
FRICKEY, LAW& PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); DENNIsC. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11 (1989).
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Given that this concern is valid, a true interpretive dilemma arises. The
WTO decisionmaking bodies seem prepared to err on the side of enabling trade
rather than enabling trade-restricting social measures. A view driven by only
environmental and labor concerns might, in a similar fashion, blindly support
all such measures without considering their impact on foreign producers,
domestic consumers, and the world economy.
The proper interpretive stance becomes much harder to strike if one
accepts both that disguised protectionism is a danger and should be
discouraged, and that social regulations are nevertheless a central function of
the state that are supported and required by international environmental and
labor law. However difficult this puzzle is, it is quite clear that this problem
cannot be avoided. The growing importance of WTO law, and of concerns
relating to international environmental and labor standards, requires that the
question be faced head-on and with a willingness to consider novel approaches.
Andrew Guzman, for example, has suggested that trade and nontrade
linkage "be determined through a political process of negotiation rather than
through the quasi-judicial dispute resolution processes of the WTO.'
25
Guzman's argument might be buttressed by reference to the case of intellectual
property rights. Article XX, the General Exceptions provision of the GATT,
contains a clause allowing governments to take trade-restrictive measures
necessary to enforce intellectual property law.' 26 If the General Exceptions
measure truly does provide all the support necessary for governments to enforce
trade-related measures that might restrict imports, presumably no need to have
negotiated TRIPs would have arisen. The TRIPs were negotiated, however,
notwithstanding both a recognition of intellectual property protection in the
GATT's General Exceptions provision and a well-developed body of existing
international law outside of the GATT. The fact that negotiation occurred
lends credence to the arguments that some integration of affirmative obligations
to labor and environmental standards is required for those standards' proper
enforcement and that the current exceptions-driven regime is inadequate.
This Part has examined the reasons within WTO law that negotiation of
affirmative obligations might be necessary to preserve the integrity of
international environmental and labor law. In other words, labor and
environmental standards might better be incorporated through legislation rather
125. Andrew T. Guzman, Trade Labor, Legitimacy, 91 CAL. L. REv. 885, 887 (2003); see
generally Guzman, supra note I.
126. See GATF art. XX(d) (allowing for trade-restrictive measures "necessary to secure
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, including those relating to... the protection of patents, trade marks and
copyrights").
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than adjudication. The next Part looks at the basis for creating such obligations
and some of the challenges that would accompany such an effort.
IV. Incorporation Through Legislation
This Part highlights issues that legislation of affirmative labor and
environmental obligations would have to resolve. When the question of
content is directly addressed, problems of form arise that are not evident simply
by focusing on the question from within WTO law. These problems reveal
themselves when asking basic questions about constructing a set of positive
rules. First, what obligations would such an agreement impose? Second, how
would such obligations be enforced in the WTO system? Beyond such
questions of form, however, there is the question of the substantive propriety of
incorporating nontrade issues into the international trade regime. This Part
observes concerns that could be raised with respect to each of these questions,
but finds that these concerns by themselves should not bar pursuit of
incorporation of labor and environmental standards through incorporation.
A. Specification Costs
In determining the environmental and labor obligations to be incorporated,
negotiating parties would confront several kinds of costs. As Joel Trachtman
has observed, the negotiation of rights and obligations entails a host of costs.
127
The most immediate source of such costs would be the allocation of resources
required to achieve greater specificity through negotiation and drafting. ,28 In
addition, however, the negotiation and drafting of specific rules would be
susceptible to strategic behavior that, whatever its potential benefits, might also
impose costs. 129 This Part elaborates on each of these basic insights.
127. See Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Pescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT'L
L. 1, 51 (2001) (stating that rules cost more to develop than standards); see also Joel P.
Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333,350-56 (1999)
(same).
128. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, supra note 127, at 35 1.
129. See Trachtman, Economic Analysis of PrescriptiveJurisdiction, supra note 127, at 31
(including strategic behaviour in transaction costs).
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1. Negotiation and Drafting Issues
Traditionally, international environmental and labor law have developed
through the slow accretion of obligations. Shifting from a "soft law" to a "hard
law" mode of legal development would require a series of legal
transformations. First, states would have to substantially increase the
concreteness of their commitments under labor and environment agreements.
International labor and environmental law each contain several hundred
documents of legal significance. An immediate problem in drafting affirmative
obligations would be the difficulty in identifying which obligations to
incorporate. In international labor law, for example, the International Labor
Organization (ILO) has adopted more than 400 formally binding conventions
and nonbinding recommendations.
The identification of core labor standards, however, has tended to center
around a relatively small set of instruments. 130  This small set of core
instruments is one of the reasons that noted international labor law expert
Virginia Leary has argued that labor rights are among the better-defined rights
in public international law.'3 ' The WTO's 1996 declaration that the ILO was
the competent body for administering international labor law sparked a renewed
effort by the ILO at consolidation and streamlining. One important result was
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 32 The
Declaration identifies the following four core labor standards:
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation.
33
130. See Virginia A. Leary, Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause
(GA TT, ILO, NAFTA, US. Laws), in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR
FREE TRADE? LEGAL ANALYSIS 177, 215 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996)
(noting the conventions that have been most widely ratified).
13 1. See id. at 181 (discussing the meaning of workers' rights).
132. See International Labour Conference: ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work, art. 2, June 19, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233, 1237-38 (1998) (stating that all
member states have an obligation to promote the four core labor standards).
133. Id.
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The Declaration appears to be the ILO's explicit recognition of the
institutional challenge articulated by the WTO. 3 4 It also appears to recognize
that a critical aspect of meeting this institutional challenge is articulating
obligations that are finite and concrete rather than expansive and diffuse.
Although the list essentially reflects prevailing opinion, some accounts do
vary. For example, regulations proposed in a 1996 Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) study would prohibit forced but not
compulsory labor; it would call for an end to "exploitative forms of child
labour" rather than its effective abolition.'1 5 Labor economist Gary Fields
would concur with the looser child labor standard and the stricter forced labor
standard. 3 6 Fields would also eschew the nondiscrimination provision in favor
of either a general commitment to safety in working conditions or full
disclosure about the lack thereof.37 Adelle Blackett has articulated a more
general critique of the "core rights" approach. 138 Nonetheless, the Declaration
firmly rests on accumulated principles of international labor law, 139 as well as
on international human rights law.'
40
134. See ILO Declaration Background, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standardsldec
/declaration/ background/index.htm (last modified July 24, 2001) (describing the 1996 WTO
Singapore Declaration to the WTO Ministerial Conference as providing "the opportunity for a
second step to be taken").
135. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., TRADE, EMPLOYMENT, AND
LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 26
(1996) (suggesting four "core" standards based upon human rights that create necessary
framework for other meaningful labor standards).
136. See Gary S. Fields, International and Comparative, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 571,
572 (1996) (reviewing INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS AND ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE
(Werner Sengenberger & Duncan Campbell eds., 1994)) (arguing that future labor agreements
should prohibit all forced labor but allow child labor under certain circumstances).
137. See id. (providing a modest list of "core rights" to make it easier for countries to honor
a rights agreement and punish violators).
138. Blackett, supra note 102, at 32-34 (preferring an examination of the legitimacy of
"core labor rights" to a technical legal critique).
139. This foundation exists despite the fact that the ILO does not explicitly allude to any
specific preceding instruments. For a discussion of this point, as well as a thorough exposition
of the basis in prior international labor law for the ILO Declaration, see Blackett, supra note
102, at 13-25.
140. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 135, at 27 (stating that the list
reflects "well-established elements of international jurisprudence concerning human
rights .. "). As Blackett stated:
Despite some differences, the principles contained in the ILO instruments are
considered to be 'almost completely consistent' with UN texts such as Article 23(4)
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 22 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 8 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
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Identifying a "core" set of environmental obligations is more difficult.
Even with this difficulty, international environmentalists seem to view the
proliferation of agreements as a good thing.14' There have been several
coordinated attempts to establish a "core" agreement and other calls for such an
instrument. The International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (IUCN), or World Conservation Union, spearheaded a negotiation
that resulted in a Draft International Covenant on Environment and
Development. 42 The draft Covenant sought to establish a single framework for
all of the treaties.1 43 Another stepping stone was the 1982 World Charter for
Nature which, although focused on conservation, more broadly "announces a
series of general principles intended to guide the actions of States, of
international organizations and even of individuals, with respect to nature."'44
To date, however, there is no distillation of environmental principles
similar to the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work.145 Potentially comparable instruments are either far too broad or far too
specific. For example, the 1992 UNCED produced two instruments that
attempted "distillation:" the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development,146 and Agenda 21, a global agenda for achieving sustainable
development.147 Agenda 21 is not so much a declaration of core principles as a
Blackett, supra note 102, at 15. See also Report of the World Summit for Social Development,
ch. 1, 29, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.166/9 (1995) (committing to pursue goals of ensuring
quality jobs, basic rights, and respect for conventions); see generally R. Michael Gadbow &
Michael T. Medwig, Multinational Enterprises and International Labor Standards: Which Way
for Development & Jobs?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTs AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 14 1,
143-46 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996) (reviewing the legal and economic
debates concerning trade and labor policy).
141. See Palmer, supra note 27, at 262 ("If we consider the new instruments that have
developed the international law for the environment in the last twenty years, we would be
pardoned for thinking that the record is a good one.").
142. Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, International Union
for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (2d ed. 2000), [hereinafter IUCN Draft
Covenant] available at http://www.iucn.org/themes/law/pdfdocuments/EPLP31ENsecond.pdf.
For an introduction to this document, see generally Nicholas A. Robinson, IUCN's Proposed
Covenant on Environment & Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 133 (1995).
143. See IUCN Draft Covenant, supra note 142, art. I (stating that its objective is "to
achieve environmental conservation and sustainable development by establishing integrated
rights and obligations").
144. Pallemaerts, supra note 35, at 627.
145. International Labor Conference: ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233.
146. REPORT OF THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENV'T & DEV., at 8-13, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 15 1/26 (Vol. I), U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.8 (1992).
147. See id. at 15-16 (describing need for, and requirements of, "a global partnership for
sustainable development").
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compendium of specific policy recommendations, running into the hundreds of
pages. The Rio Declaration suffers from the opposite problem; it offers little
more than brief but extremely expansive aspirational statements. For example,
Principle 1 declares that "[h]uman beings... are entitled to a healthy and
productive life in harmony with nature."' 148  Moreover, unlike the ILO
Declaration, neither the Rio Declaration nor Agenda 21 developed from pre-
existing international agreements. They are formally nonbinding instruments,
so that any recognition of them as sources of "core" rules of international law
would necessitate a finding that they constitute "customary international law."
Determining which standards are customary international law, however, is a
notoriously indeterminate business.
49
Critics have faulted these subsequent generations of public international
law rights for their failure to follow traditional form. Consideration of the
classical contours of legal entitlements yields the conclusion that a right yields a
corresponding obligation on another party.150 Take two prominent principles of
international labor law and international environmental law: the right to
work ' and the right to a healthy environment.15 2 It may not be immediately
148. Id. at 8.
149. See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, Customary International Law and State Taxation of
Corporate Income: The Casefor the Separate Accounting Method, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'LL. 99,
101 (1996) (stating that the Supreme Court "has remained curiously indifferent to the apparent
status of the separate accounting method as an international standard" despite foreign protest).
150. As defined by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, this consideration further exposes the
uncertainties accruing to certain types of international environmental and labor rights.
Hohfeld's well-known typologies run as follows:
Jural rights privilege power immunity
Opposites no-rights duty disability liability
Jural right privilege power immunity
Correlatives duty no-right liability disability
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913).
151. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 23, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., at 75, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against
unemployment."); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, art. 6(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 ("The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work
which he freely chooses or accepts. .. ").
152. See Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, princ. I, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.48/14 at 4 (1972), reprinted in I I I.L.M. 1416, 1417-18 (1972) ("Man has the
fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a
quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to
protect and improve the environment for present and future generations."); see also Declaration
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clear whether these rights generate specific individual claims or obligations
broadly owed to collective populations. 113
In considering these difficulties, however, it should be noted that
international trade law, particularly in its earliest and most fundamental
documents, contains rules equally as broad and undefined in application as core
rules of labor or environmental law. For example, Article I of the GATT,
viewed by many as the most important provision in the GATT/WTO regime,
provides that all members must receive equal trade treatment from each
other.5 4 Article Ill of the GAIT provides that each member state must provide
equal trade treatment to domestic and foreign producers.' Through the
dispute settlement system, member states have articulated and clarified the
exact contours of the broad principles. As in constitutional law, the breadth of
a principle may render it more, rather than less, suitable to elaboration through
the settlement of disputes.
Another difficulty, at least as challenging, arises when one attempts to
envision how the WTO's dispute settlement system as currently configured
would enforce any core set of labor or environmental standards, assuming they
could be identified. The complainant's standing to initiate a complaint in the
system provides a significant problem.
At the international level, only governments may bring WTO disputes
against another government.5 6 Typically, the complainant state alleges that the
respondent state has, in violating one or more obligations under the
GATT/WTO, caused "nullification or impairment" of the complainant's
of Bizkaia on the Right to the Environment, UNESCO, 30th Sess., art. 1, at 4, U.N. Doc.
30C/INF. I I (1999) ("Everyone has the right, individually or in association with others, to enjoy
a healthy and ecologically balanced environment."); W. Paul Gormley, The Right to a Safe and
Decent Environment, 28 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 1, 10-12 (1988) (examining environmental rights of
individuals and between nations); Luis E. Rodriguez-Rivera, Is the Human Right to
Environment Recognized under International Law? It Depends on the Source, 12 COLO. J. INT'L
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 9-16 (200 1) (defining a human right to environment); Melissa Thorrne,
Establishing Environment as a Human Right, 19 DEN.. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 301,303-18 (199 1)
(discussing the emergence of a right to environment within the United Nations).
153. See Norbert Horn, Normative Problems of a New International Economic Order, 16 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 338, 343 (1982) (providing a classic critique of the formal problems of
"emerging" international law).
154. GATT 1947, supra note 44, art. I(i).
155. Id. art. Ill.
156. This intergovernmental form will likely persist for the foreseeable future, although
some have argued for private rights of standing. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Private Parties and
GA 7T Dispute Resolution: Implications of the Panel Report on Section 337 of the U.S. Tariff
Act of 1930, J. WORLD TRADE, June 1990, at 5. But see Roger Arnold, Why a Private Right of
Action against Dumping Would Violate GATT, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 666, 696 (1991).
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entitlements under the GATT/WTO. 1 7 GATT/WTO complaints derive from
an asserted harm imposed by one government on another government's
nationals, whose interests their government then represents in a claim against
the harm-imposing government. The conceptions of harm require more indirect
conception of the wrong resulting from the violation of a right than normally is
recognized. The enforcement of these rules by the international trade regime
would require substantial expansion of the concept of a right beyond its
traditional boundaries.
Once again, these problems are not insurmountable, but they do require a
broad understanding of the harms that result from a violation of international
labor and environmental standards. A member wishing to bring a DSB claim
must allege that its rights under the WTO have been violated by another
member's noncompliance. An allegation of environmental harm, for example,
would require an assertion that the respondent government's departure from its
obligation harms not only the environment of its own territory, but also the
complainant government's environment.
This broad conception of environmental harm is not novel. Rather, the
principle of the "global commons" underlies many of the important
international documents of environmental law.'5 8 Environmentalists argue that
because of the global ecosystem's interdependence, environmental obligations
should not follow territorial boundaries.' 9 Indeed, many cases show that
environmentally damaging practices in one country harm the environments of
other countries.' 60
157. See GATT 1947, supra note 44, art. 23 (addressing nullification and impairment).
158. See Sumudu Atapattu, Sustainable Development, Myth or Reality?: A Survey of
Sustainable Development Under International Law and Sri Lankan Law, 14 GEo. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REv. 265, 298-299 (2001) ("Traditional international environmental law dealt only with
extra-territorial effects of state activities and the effects on the global commons."); Rajendra
Ramlogan, The Environment and International Law: Rethinking the Traditional Approach, 3
RES COMMUNES: VT. J. ENv'T, 100 (Jan. 15, 2002), at http://www.vje.org/articles/ramlogan.
html ("Again, the protection of the global commons is vital to human kind and the emergence of
international environmental law to serve such a purpose is inevitable.").
159. For example, highly migratory fish stocks and turtle species transcend national
boundaries. Howard L. Brown, The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: An Analysis of International Environmental Law and the
Conference's FinalAgreement, 21 VT. L. REv. 547,549-550 (1996); see Carl Bruch, Charting
New Waters: Public Involvement in the Management ofInternational Watercourses, 31 ENvrL.
L. REP. 11,389, 11,390-91 (2001) (discussing the importance of international waters to
individuals).
160. Acid rain and other forms of transboundary pollution exemplify such effects. See
John Warren Kindt, Dispute Settlement in International Environmental Issues: The Model
Provided by the 1982 Convention on the Law ofthe Sea, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 1097,
1107 (1989) (citing water and air as media for transporting pollution).
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Rendering international labor law enforceable under the WTO also
requires a broad conception of harm. If, as is most likely, the victims of a
respondent government's violation were the respondent's own nationals, they
could not bring a complaint against their own government in the WTO dispute
settlement system. Rather, another WTO member government would have to
challenge the practice. The complainant state would have to allege that the
respondent's failure to eliminate child labor nullifies and impairs its benefits
under the agreement.
Again, this principle of cross-national harm is not alien to international
labor law. The foundational document of the 1LO declares that "the failure of
any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of
other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries."''
According to this principle, one WTO member could argue that another
member's failure to honor child labor standards impedes its own ability to
uphold child labor standards in its own territory. Indeed, this "race to the
bottom" argument animates much of the movement to set international labor
standards. 162 In the context of labor law, the argument is not an empirical one
about the links between environmental damage in one region and
environmental fallout in another. Rather, the argument concerns the economic
impact of labor violations in one region on labor protections in another. The
argument would be that a country's willingness to tolerate labor violations
nullifies and impairs another country's protections by increasing the pressure
on that country to tolerate similar labor abuses or risk losing investment to the
violator.
Although empirical evidence may support some claims of indirect harm, it
will undoubtedly not support all.' 63 It is of central importance to note that
16 1. ILO Constitution, supra note 10, part XIII, § 1,49 Stat. at 2714, 225 Consol. T.S. at
373.
162. See GAT Secretariat, European Economic Community-Payments and Subsidies
Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, L/6627-
37S/86, 1989 GATTPD LEXIS 12, * 128-30 (Jan. 25, 1990) (noting that governments cannot
accurately predict the effect of their interventions on import volumes).
163. With respect to labor regulation, some commentators have argued that many labor
protections will have little or no impact on the cost of production. A state's commitment to
protecting the right to freedom of association, for example, imposes no immediate cost on
producers. See Summers, supra note 102, at 67 (arguing that "[o]bservance of these core labor
rights" such as those prohibiting forced labor, child labor, and discrimination "would have
minimal impact on labor costs"). Increased freedom of association, however, may well lead to
increased union formation, which will in turn lead to increased success in the introduction of
certain concessions to labor, such as increased measures and decreased workweeks. Such
concessions would almost certainly raise the marginal cost of labor. The common assumption is
that increasing the cost of labor will increase the overall cost of production, and therefore will
tend to increase price. Increased price will in turn tend to decrease consumption and therefore
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WTO law, however, does not require the strictures of empirically proved
causation. Indeed, an important turning point for the interpretation of
GATT/WTO standards was a panel's conclusion that a complainant
government did not have to show that the respondent government's violation of
a rule resulted in an identifiable harm to the complainant government's
nationals."' Rather, the Panel adopted an irrebuttable presumption that any
rule violation would necessarily harm the "conditions of competition" for
foreign nationals operating in the respondent government's market.165 In this
sense, the GATT/WTO regime has long departed from the traditional notion of
a legal claim as requiring proof not only of the wrong, but also of the harm.
Based on the looser conception of actionability employed by the
GATT/WTO, determining conceptions of harm required by international labor
and environmental law will be less of a stretch. Under current GATT/WTO
law, a complainant government argues that a respondent government's trade
actions harm the "competitive conditions" for the complainant government's
nationals, established by trade. Under a trade-related labor agreement, the
complainant government could argue that the respondent government's actions
harm the "conditions for securing labor standards" for its own nationals. Under
a trade-related environment agreement, the complainant government could
make a similar argument about the "conditions for securing environmental
standards." Alternatively, the complainant government could argue that the
respondent government's actions harm "conditions for global environmental
integrity," thereby damaging the complainant government's nationals.'66
trade volume. Yet this assumption need not hold-increased labor costs need not increase
overall production costs. On the contrary, improving labor conditions can increase labor
productivity so that output per cost unit of labor actually increases. See OECD, TRADE,
EMPLOYMENT, AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 80-82 (1996). The focus on productivity is a touchstone of proponents
of labor protection, including the ILO. Blackett, supra note 102, at 49 ("[H]igher labor
standards may increase competitiveness and productivity."). Notably, however, the very same
argument that labor protections will not affect production costs might undermine a case that a
labor violation in one country creates a harm in another country.
164. United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, 34 BISD 136
(1988), para. 5.1.9.
165. Id.
166. One could abandon any conception of empirical harm and adopt a much more
altruistic understanding. That is, labor and environmental violations abroad harm me insofar as
I want the interests ofjustice served worldwide. This broader conception contradicts not only
the individualistic conception of rights, but also the notion that a foreign government, by virtue
of its sovereignty, is not answerable to outsiders for wrongs it commits that impose harm
exclusively on its own citizens. This is precisely the challenge posed by the international human
rights movement.
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The issue of remedy poses similar problems. Assume that the United
States wins a complaint against Colombia for nonenforcement of international
environmental obligations, or that Spain wins a complaint against Portugal for
nonenforcement of labor standards. How would the WTO determine the
appropriate remedy? How might the WTO measure the harm?
First, it is important to recall that the WTO dispute settlement system
imposes a monetary penalty as a last resort only after the recalcitrant state has
failed to reform its practices and policies satisfactorily within the stated time
limit. 167  Nevertheless, monetary penalties, in the form of suspension of
concessions by the adversely affected government, can be and are imposed
under the WTO system.1
68
At first, the problem of measuring the appropriate remedy for infraction of
labor or environmental standards seems alarming. Quantifying the damage
resulting from either of the hypothesized cases seems impossibly nebulous
when compared with a hypothetical involving Colombia or Portugal imposing
an inappropriate tariff. Upon closer examination, however, it turns out that
similar problems of quantification already exist in the system. For example, the
system provides a remedy when a country fails to impose intellectual property
protection.' 69 When such a remedy takes the form of a monetary amount, it is
167. The Dispute Settlement Understanding provides that "[w]here a panel or the Appellate
Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend
that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement."
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO
Agreement, supra note 44, Annex 2, Art. 19, 11 [Treaties Binder 1, Treaties Booklet 2] L. &
Prac. World Trade Org. (Oceana) I, 17 (Mar. 1995), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125,1237 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU] (citations omitted). The "Member concerned" must take appropriate action
within a "reasonable period of time" generally not exceeding fifteen months from the date of
adoption of the finding. Id. art. 21, 3 [Treaties Binder 1, Treaties Booklet 2], L. & Prac.
World Trade Org. (Oceana) at 18,33 I.L.M. at 1238.
168. Article 22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding provides that
If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a
covered agreement into compliance.., within the reasonable period of time
determined .. , any party having invoked dispute settlement procedures may
request authorization from the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] to suspend the
application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the
covered agreements .... [T]he DSB ... shall grant [such] authorization ... within
30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time unless the DSB decides by
consensus to reject the request.
Id. art. 22, M 2, 6, [Treaties Binder 1, Treaties Booklet 2] L. & Prac. World Trade Org.
(Oceana) at 20, 22, 33 I.L.M at 1239-40.
169. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, supra note 44, Annex I C [Treaties Binder 1, Treaties Booklet I], L. & Prac.
World Trade Org. (Oceana) 383 (Mar. 1995), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
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determined through an evidentiary analysis similar to many instances of
calculating damage awards. Moreover, the suspension of concessions need not
take the form of a monetary amount; rather, it can take the form of the
suspension of other obligations.' 70
The above discussion demonstrates that, even if proponents of the
establishment of WTO agreements on labor and environmental standards
overcome the arguments against them, real problems of legal form will
accompany any attempt to establish these standards. To begin with, issues of
coherence may provide difficult problems in identifying core rules for
incorporation, although international labor law has gone much further to redress
this difficulty than international environmental law. Problems relating to the
specific content of such standards, even if they could be identified, follow.
Finally, problems of standing would arise with any attempt to enforce these
standards under the current WTO dispute resolution system.
The discussions above have indicated that the same problems of
coherence, content, and harm identification have arisen in the latter regimes.
These difficulties do not confine themselves solely to international
environmental and labor law. They have historically plagued international
trade law as well. 17' The fact that these difficulties of form have arisen in many
170. See DSU, supra note 167, art. 22, 2-3 [Treaties Binder], Treaties Booklet 2], L. &
Prac. World Trade Org. (Oceana) at 20,33 I.L.M. at 1239 (giving the complainant country the
right, when it cannot reach an agreement on appropriate compensation with the breaching
country through negotiations, to "request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application
to the [breaching] member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreements" (emphasis added)).
171. During the Uruguay Round, many governments of developing countries argued that
the incorporation of intellectual property rights would yield disproportionate benefits to
developed countries and disproportionate costs to them. See generally Ruth Gana Okediji,
Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 117(1999);
Evelyn Su, The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights and its Effects on Developing Countries, 3 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169
(2000). For an historical account of TRIPS in the context of international law, as well as an
account of how TRIPS stacks up on social issues, including public health pandemics of
particular concern to some developing countries, see James Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents,
Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 261 (2002). For a more general
discussion of transfer of technology, see Chantal Thomas, Transfer of Technology in the
Contemporary International Order, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2096,2105-1I1 (1999).
Many now argue that the incorporation of labor and environmental standards is no more
than another strategy by industrialized countries to tip the market's scales in their favor. Jose E.
Alvarez & Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question ofLinkage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 126, 127-
28 (2002). Bhagwati and Alvarez write:
By [the] test of mutual advantage [between developed countries and developing
countries], the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) does not belong to the WTO. It facilitates, even enforces with the aid of
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different areas of international law demonstrates their prevalence in the
challenge of constructing an international legal regime. The difference,
therefore, is one of degree. Nevertheless, any attempt to establish
affirmative labor and environmental obligations through the negotiation of
WTO agreements would have to overcome these difficulties.
2. Negotiating Skews and Challenges to Legislative Legitimacy
The legislative incorporation of labor and environmental standards
would confront numerous costs related to the identification and
elaboration of relatively more specific rights and obligations than
currently exist. The above discussion assumes, however, that given
enough resources, an agreement that reflected the genuine aggregate
preferences of member states would be possible. However, strategic
dynamics might so skew negotiating tactics that this "genuine"
aggregation could be indeterminable, adding significantly to the
challenge of negotiation. Two familiar such problems are the danger of
capture and the problem of strategic holdout.
trade sanctions, what is in the main payment by the poor countries (which consume
intellectual property) to the rich countries (which produce it) .... We also
demonstrated to the next set of northern lobbies that they could do the same. Thus,
the unions now say: you did it for capital, so do it for "nature." And the poor
countries that have no lobbies anywhere like the sumptuous ones such as the Sierra
Club and the AFL-CIO now find themselves at the receiving end of a growing list
of lobbying demands that the northern politicians are ready to concede.
Id.
Rather than being brushed aside, this similarity must inform any attempt at redrawing WTO
law to incorporate labor and environmental standards. Sufficient sensitivity to the
circumstances of developing countries, including economic, social, and cultural differences, is
paramount. When the time comes to remove the gloves of diplomacy and get down to the brass
tacks of negotiation, this sensitivity has required a quid pro quo approach: a recognition that
compliance will prove disproportionately costly to developing countries, and a commitment to
redress some of the cost. Quid pro quo of this sort is not only nonobjectionable, it is the
lifeblood of intergovernmental negotiations and therefore a necessary component to any
situation in which equally sovereign nations differ in their approaches to an issue.
Any integration of labor and environment standards, therefore, would almost certainly
require offsetting measures for developing countries. Again, the example of TRIPs is
informative. In exchange for IP concessions, developing countries gained agriculture and
textiles concessions that had been denied to them throughout the preceding history of the trade
regime.
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a. Capture
Public choice literature reminds us that it is quite possible and, under
certain conditions, likely for governments to cater to narrow interests at the
expense of the wider population. 172 Traditionally, trade circles most fear the
interests of protectionist industries which seek to keep out competitive
imports. 73 In the contemporary linkage debate, fears have turned to modern-
day "green protectionism" in which interest groups in rich countries might seek
to cloak anticompetitive impulses in expressions of concern about "social
dumping" or, even more insidiously, solicit trade sanctions by claiming concern
for the well-being of those in poor countries. 114  In the debate over
incorporation of labor and environmental standards into the trade regime, some
economic development advocates have characterized initiatives by Northern
governments as serving both traditional industrial protectionists and new-
fashioned social protectionists. The skewing of Northern interests, according to
this account, has exacerbated effects on multilateral negotiations because of the
imbalance of both negotiating capacity and economic bargaining power.
This story of capture by protectionists vastly understates the range of
potential dangers. First, Northern observers just as often criticize protrade
policy for being the consequence of government capture by multinational
industries with a strong interest in keeping cross-border costs low. 75 Defenders
of social regulations argue that they reflect "genuine" democratic preferences
for balancing economic growth with other dimensions of quality of life, which
free traders threaten to undermine.
If the story of capture in the North must be complicated, similar
complications should attend examination of developing-country government
positions. The notion of a North-South divide in which the North is
aggressively pro-labor and pro-environment and the South is aggressively anti-
labor and anti-environment is complicated not only because powerful interest
groups clearly exist on the other side of the debate within the North, but also
because the statement of a monolithic position from the South is far too
simplistic. First, it adopts a puzzlingly thin view of domestic politics in
172. See generally FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 124; MUELLER, supra note 124.
173. See Chantal Thomas, Challengesfor Democracy and Trade: The Case ofthe United
States, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 7-9, on file with Washington
and Lee Law Review) (noting that domestic industries which are economically hurt by free trade
will pressure legislatures to pass protective measures).
174. Supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
175. See Thomas, supra note 173, at 22-24 (asserting that multinational industries are
more likely than smaller producers to lobby for antiprotection measures).
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developing countries. If India is the largest democracy in the world, it comes as
no surprise that one finds within India a range of views and interests at least as
diverse as that of any industrialized nation. And, indeed, within India one finds
a deep tradition of "green" politics and values, as well as the most vocal of
environmental advocates. Just as the specter of capture looms within
industrialized country governments from both sides of the linkage debate, the
statements of trade representatives of developing countries may not reflect the
full range of views therein. And with respect to international labor law, one
might refer to the formal complaint brought against labor practices in Malaysia
as one example of developing-country coalition politics around labor standards.
Not only is there a range of views within developing countries, there is
also a range of views between them. A number of developing countries have
endorsed increased enforcement of international environmental law. Such
endorsement might derive from a relatively strong "green" political culture, as
with Costa Rica's devotion to protection of its ecosystems. It might also derive
from immediate concerns about cross-national environmental harms. In recent
years, so-called "small island developing states" have argued that climate
changes resulting from industrial pollution have caused weather-system
volatility which in turn has led to hurricanes and tropical storms of great human
and economic cost. The developing-country "bloc" in multilateral negotiations
may not fully reflect this range of views among developing-country
governments.
b. Strategic Holdout
In addition to susceptibility to capture by particular interests, governments
would undoubtedly link legislative negotiations on labor and environmental
standards to negotiations on other issues. "Strategic linkage," as David
Leebron has observed, offers governments a bargaining tool in negotiations in
which their respective positions are at cross-purposes. 176 Reciprocity in
bargaining is a time-honored expectation that finds widespread, if contested,
adherence in trade negotiations. 77 Such bargaining can lead governments to
176. See David Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5, 12-14 (2002) (discussing how
countries strategically link unrelated subjects in order to strengthen their negotiating positions).
For example, the United States might attempt to link human rights with trade negotiations. Id.
177. As Steve Chamovitz recently observed, the 1947 GATr explicitly called for tariff
negotiations on a "reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis." Steve Chamovitz,
Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 28, 37 (2002) (quoting Art.
XXVIII bis: 1, 1947 GATF). As Chamovitz also noted, however, the traditional case for trade
liberalization emphasizes its benefits independently of reciprocal action by other states; from
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hold out on making certain concessions in order to win greater reciprocal
concessions. From one perspective, this is an effective bargaining tool; from
another, it is a source of distortion that might prevent otherwise optimal rules
from reaching fruition. 7 8
3. The Amendment Alternative
Although the preceding discussion has focused on the costs of
transitioning from a hard law regime to a soft law regime, it is important to note
that such a regime can offer several benefits. Because devising rigorous rule
systems is costly, a soft law regime can conserve resources. Take, for example,
the stock soft law strategy of adopting a broad and nonbinding statement of
principle over a specific and formally binding legal commitment. This strategy
detracts from the coherence and enforceability of the rule, and critics view these
detractions as net costs to the lawmaking effort. This strategy also offers
several benefits. The specification costs substantially decline, because parties
need only agree on a broad principle. In addition, the likelihood of cost-
inducing strategic behavior decreases. Because a broad standard is less likely
to impose an onerous compliance burden than a specific rule, the leverage
generated by bargaining in exchange for concession to it will be much lower.
Accordingly, the likelihood of holdout because of staunch political opposition
by some member states makes ratification of a more specific and binding
commitment impossible. 7 9
So far this Article has considered the feasibility, as measured by the
relative costs, of negotiating specific affirmative obligations as an alternative to
the status quo of "general exceptions" for social regulation. But intermediate,
and therefore less costly, alternatives that preserve the "soft law" flexibility of
this view, at least some forms of conditional trade negotiation, namely those directed towards
trade liberalization, constitute "unjustified strategic linkage." Id. at 34.
178. See Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, supra note 127, at 38
(noting that holdout problems, which stem from one negotiator's "inability to know the true
valuation assigned by the other participant in the transaction," pose difficulty in systems
requiring negotiation of each transaction).
179. The costs could be more benign, however, and could be associated with the difficulty
of reaching agreement on a specific practice, even where states are committed to the principle.
In such cases, vagueness may yield real transactional benefits by reducing transactional costs.
For example, states may all desire to take measures to improve wildlife conservation, but they
may differ in their preferences for what means to employ. Vagueness allows for agreement on
this principle while avoiding, or at least deferring, the costs of specification. As discussed
above, vagueness is widely characteristic of "core" or "framing" principles of legal systems,
whether international or domestic.
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the current international labor and environmental regimes might exist that also
shore up the status of labor and environment commitments in current WTO
law. For example, rather than crafting stand-alone obligations, one could
amend the current provisions that provide exceptions or other allowances for
governments to take social measures.
Amending these current laws to recognize basic international labor and
environmental principles would support the efforts of individual governments
to implement their commitments under these principles. For example, GAT[
Article XX, the "General Exceptions" provision, allows governments to take
trade-restrictive measures that would otherwise violate GATr/WTO rules,
when those measures fulfill specified social objectives. 80 One could amend the
provisions of Article XX to incorporate identified principles of international
labor and environmental law. Drafters could amend Article XX(b) to read
"necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health in accordance with
principles recognized in the multilateral environmental agreements listed in the
annex hereto,"181 and GAT" Article XX(g) to read "relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources in accordance with principles recognized in
the multilateral environmental agreements listed in the annex hereto."' 82 The
annex would then list any multilateral environmental agreements that WTO
members felt had attained a sufficient level of legitimacy to warrant their
specific recognition. Likewise, Article XX(e) could read "relating to products
of labour conditions not in accordance with the international abour principles
listed in the annex hereto."'8 3 In a similar vein, the SPS Agreement could
provide that members "have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary
measures in accordance with the precautionary principle."'
8 4
One might argue that such an amendment is unnecessary because WTO
Panels have already recognized other bodies of international law. As discussed
180. See infra note 213 and accompanying text (allowing governments to take trade-
restrictive measures necessary to enforce intellectual property law).
181. Article XX, l(b) currently reads "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health." GATT 1947, supra note 44, art. XX, I(b), 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
182. Article XX, I I(g) currently reads "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption." GATT' 1947, supra note 44, art. XX, (g), 61 Stat. at A61, 55
U.N.T.S. at 262.
183. Article XX, I i(e) currently reads "relating to the products of prison labour." GATT
1947, supra note 44, art. XX, l(e), 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
184. The SPS Agreement currently reads "[m]embers have the right to take sanitary and
phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement." SPS
Agreement, supra note 108, art. 2, I [Treaties Binder 1, Treaties Booklet I] L. & Prac. World
Trade Org. (Oceana) at 60.
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above in Part IlI, however, not all GATT/WTO decisions have taken a
charitable view of the relationship between Members' obligations under other
international agreements and their trade-related environmental policies. Early
decisions such as Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle I suggested that an
environmental measure would have to be specifically required by a multilateral
environmental agreement in order for its recognition as an implementation
activity under that agreement. 15 Agreements that stick to broad statements of
principle, therefore, may not justify specific practices. While more recently
Shrimp-Turtle II seems to have relaxed that principle, the range of
interpretations to be found in the jurisprudence may not provide sufficient
security to members; put another way, the uncertainty might dissuade members
from pursuing environmental policies that impact trade.
Indeed, WTO Panels have not specifically addressed the question of what
happens when a WTO rule and a commitment to a multilateral environmental
agreement directly conflict. An amendment to Article XX would be clear in
protecting such specific practices, and in establishing that they should survive
any conflict with GAITIrWTO law. Similar dynamics would pertain to
international labor law. In like fashion, the current interpretation of the SPS
Agreement rejects the precautionary principle and therefore narrows the scope
of the allowances under that agreement to adopt health and safety restrictions
on trade. The proposed amendment would reverse the existing interpretation.
What such amendments would not do is impose affirmative obligations on
governments to adopt labor and environmental protections. In that sense, the
amendment strategy falls far short of the "trade-related agreement" strategy of
TRIPs or a labor or environment equivalent.
One need not view this entirely negatively. First, the amendment strategy
preserves the flexibility of the existing soft law regime--potentially a necessity,
depending on one'sjudgments about current political will. Second, among the
major concerns of labor and environmental advocates regarding WTO law as
currently applied is that it either discourages states from adopting labor and
environmental protections that they would otherwise take or encourages states
to dismantle existing labor and environmental protections-the "race to the
bottom" phenomenon.' 8 6 If this is true, then the concern may be not that the
185. Supra Part 11I.A.
186. Larry A. DiMatteo, et al., The Doha Declaration and Beyond: Giving a Voice to
Non-Trade Concerns Within the WTO Trade Regime, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 95, 127-28
(2003); Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Fair Trade-Free Trade Debate: Trade,
Labor, and the Environment, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 61, 76-77 (1996); Yasuko Okamoto,
Common but Differentiated Debates: Environment, Labour and the World Trade Organization,
9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 242, 243 (1996).
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existing soft law strategy for progressive, incremental, and voluntary
compliance is fundamentally flawed, but rather that the strong, new
countervailing pressures imposed by the WTO have crippled its ability to
operate. In effect, WTO law may block or erode a process of gradual accretion
that not only otherwise would occur but that may be viewed as the optimal
method for international legal development in these areas. The amendment
strategy would resolve this concern. While it would not impose affirmative
obligations, it would remove impediments currently imposed by the WTO
regime on the development of parallel regimes addressing labor and
environmental issues. A simple shift in the interpretive approach of the WTO
DSB could, of course, achieve the same result. Explicit amendment of the
relevant provisions would, however, afford Members greater legal
predictability. It would also benefit from greater legitimacy, in that it would
avoid the criticism of Panel and Appellate Body judges that they at times
disobey their mandate not to "add to or diminish" the textual obligations of the
WTO agreements.187
Finally, the amendment strategy largely coincides with the positions of the
international bodies that currently oversee and administer labor and
environmental law. This consideration brings out the point that the problem of
political will exists not only within the WTO, but also within the parallel
regimes of international labor and environmental law. Neither the ILO nor the
UNEP, the premier international agencies in labor and environmental law
respectively, have endorsed the call for WTO agreements on labor and
environment rights. Rather, each has focused on improving enforcement
mechanisms in the existing labor and environmental regimes.'
V The TRIPs Precedent
This Part makes the observation that the WTO's intellectual property (IP)
law has followed an arc similar to that now recommended by advocates for
187. The WTO rules on dispute settlement state that "[r]econmendations and rulings of the
DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."
Art. 3(2), Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Annex 2, World Trade Organization. "In light of this [provision], any hardening of soft law that
occurs in the course of WTO dispute settlements may well be regarded by at least some WTO
members as illegitimate judicial lawmaking." Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: Half-
Truths and Consequences, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 405,424 (2003).
188. See U.N. ENv'T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 2000, 14 (1999)
(recognizing that, for environmental regulations to be effective, inspection and enforcement
must improve).
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WTO incorporation of labor and environmental obligations. A primary
objective of the WTO's establishment in 1995 "9 was to extend trade discipline
to areas of international economic activity that had been excluded under the
previous international trade regime of the GATT. 90 The WTO retained the
existing regime defined by the GATT and significantly expanded it. For
example, agreements on intellectual property, such as TRIPs,' 9' and trade in
services, such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
192
resulted from this effort.
The rationale for a WTO agreement regulating trade in services is clear:
services are a category of trade, just as goods are. By the time the Uruguay
Round began in the 1980s, the importance of internationally provided
services 193 justified the inclusion of services in the regulatory scope of
international trade law, an area previously concerned only with goods.' 94 The
rationale for a WTO agreement regulating IP is quite another matter. Although
countries can trade IP rights across borders in licensing and other rights
transferring agreements, they need not trade such rights in order for the TRIPs
Agreement to apply. The TRIPs signatories adopted the agreement because
trade affects [P rights. The value of the IP right increases with the capacity of
the right-holder to enforce it and decreases when the information can be
accessed without going through the right-holder. The latter may occur because
the producer is operating in a region where the right does not exist or is
underenforced.' 95
189. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994 [Treaties Binder 1, Marrakesh Declaration Booklet] L. & Prac.
World Trade Org. (Oceana) 5 (Mar. 1995), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1143 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
190. See GATT 1947, supra note 44, art. XI, 2, 61 Stat. at A33, 55 U.N.T.S. at 226
(listing trade activities excluded from the elimination of quantitative restrictions).
191. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 169.
192. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note
44, Annex I B, [Treaties Binder 1, Treaties Booklet I] L. & Prac. World Trade Org. (Oceana)
339 (Mar. 1995), 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]; see generally Chantal Thomas,
Globalization in Financial Services-What Role for GA TS?, 21 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 323
(2002).
193. Services covered by the GATS include telecommunications, banking, insurance,
accounting, lawyering, tourism, and health care.
194. See Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GA 7T: From the Havana Charter to
the World Trade Organization, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123, 130-31, 156-61 (1995)
(describing the GATT's historical exclusion of services from its regulatory framework and
explaining the implementation of the GATS); Jack W. Flader Jr., A Call for a General
Agreement on Trade in Services, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 661, 662-64 (1990) (describing the
United States as a "prime proponent" for negotiations on trade in services).
195. The purpose of an IP right is to allow the right-holder to control access to the
information to which the right attaches. If Disney is able to successfully control the use of all
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As with IP protection, labor and environmental standards can affect
trade flows by affecting production costs for goods and services.196 Just as
the value of an IP right will decrease if it can be evaded through trade, the
value of a labor or environmental right will also decrease if evasion through
trade is an option. Moreover, the rights themselves may erode, a
phenomenon known as the "race to the bottom."1
97
Without considering TRIPs, the trade versus nontrade distinction
might appear to justify exclusion of labor and environmental standards.
Considered in isolation, the institutional competence argument that the
WTO should not incorporate labor and environmental issues because they
are not themselves the subject of trade, even if they clearly influence and
are influenced by trade, appears more persuasive. Upon consideration of
TRIPs, however, this distinction finds itself on very shaky ground. TRIPs
concerns itself primarily with IP rights not as a subject of trade, but as a
body of standards that affect trade flows. In this respect, international IP
law is indistinguishable from international labor or environmental law in its
relation to trade. After considering the TRIPs Agreement, the trade versus
nontrade distinctions fail to explain the exclusion of labor and
environmental rights. The IP case shares other similarities with
international labor and environmental law: the international enforcement
regime that had developed was relatively weak. In addition, GATT law
harbored a "negative" exception for IP law in Article XX, similar to those
for labor and environmental standards, but the TRIPs signatories ultimately
made the political decision to strengthen this early incorporation with
clearer and more rigorous positive obligations.
Mickey Mouse images worldwide, its right to the Mickey Mouse image is very valuable. If a
firm in Hungary does not have to ask Disney for the right to the Mickey Mouse image, then the
value of that right decreases because Disney will lose the income from a licensing arrangement.
Disney will also lose the income from consumers who will buy the Hungarian firm's Mickey
Mouse T-shirts rather than Disney's. Others will see that the Hungarian firm has used the image
and will do so as well, further decreasing the "rent" that Disney can gain from its right to the
image. If the Hungarian firm can successfully sell Mickey Mouse T-shirts in the United States
or in third countries, then Disney will lose further income.
196. Cf infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text (describing the WTO's finding that,
although environmental regulations do increase production costs, they do not reduce
"competitiveness").
197. See, e.g., Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization,
and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 61-62 (1993) (describing the "race to the bottom"
theory of regulatory competition using the example of Delaware's regulation of corporations).
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A. Lack of Enforcement in Pre- WTO International Intellectual
Property Law
As with labor and the environment, IP rights developed in a free-standing
international law regime with a relatively weak enforcement mechanism. The
underenforcement of IP rights served as a major justification for integrating
them into the WTO.' 98 Prior to the Uruguay Round, multilateral instruments
for IP protection were administered by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations. 99 WIPO
was widely viewed as ineffectual. 200 The relative weakness of the multilateral
system, for example, provided a partial justification for U.S. development of
forceful unilateral mechanisms to pursue its interests in international IP law.20'
As the importance of IP-related sectors to Western economies grew,
particularly in the United States, the integration of IP rights into the
international trade regime presented a solution to the problem of weakness in
the multilateral system of IP law.202 The incorporation of IP into the
international trade regime had the potential for three salutary changes. First,
the degree of uniformity in IP protections would greatly increase as a result of
198. WORLD TRADE ORG., TRADING INTO THE FUTURE 25 (1999) (noting that the extent of
IP protection around the world "varied widely" prior to the Uruguay Round and suggesting that
"internationally-agreed trade rules for intellectual property rights were seen as a way to
introduce more order and predictability").
199. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WIPO].
200. See Robert P. Merges, Battle of Lateralisms: Intellectual Property and Trade, 8 B.U.
INT'L L. J. 239, 240 (1990) (describing an "increasingly lethargic and bureaucratized WIPO");
Brent W. Sadler, Intellectual Property Protection Through International Trade, 14 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 393, 400- 1 (1992 ) ("WIPO is of little practical use in protecting intellectual property
rights... [because] it lacks meaningful enforcement provisions such as are found in the
GATT....").
201. See Donald E. deKieffer, U.S. Trade Policy Regarding Intellectual Property Matters,
in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE SEARCH FOR A BALANCED SYSTEM
97, 102-03 (George R. Stewart et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] (describing how "agonizingly slow" progress during the GATT led
the United States to employ unilateral and bilateral trade mechanisms such as the Trade Act of
1984 to encourage other countries to protect IP rights).
202. Sadler, supra note 200, at 393. Sadler argues:
Many countries do not protect intellectual property rights to the extent desired by
the United States. Intellectual property laws differ from nation to nation, both in
scope of protected rights and enforcement. Existing multinational agreements do
not effectively protect intellectual property rights of United States citizens and
industries in the global market.
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the accession of all GATT members to a negotiated set of central protections.
20 3
Second, the trade regime's dispute settlement system could address
international IP disputes.2 4 Third, cross-sector links in the larger system would
improve the efficacy of both negotiations and enforcement. For example, if a
complainant prevailed on IP grounds, it could impose sanctions on the
respondent in non-IP sectors.05
Thus, the TRIPs signatories viewed the introduction of IP rights into the
trade regime as a way to significantly improve the efficacy of an international
IP law system plagued by lax enforcement. The problem of underenforcement
is pervasive in international law, however, and in this respect, the international
IP regime differed little from many other international systems. Certainly, the
same problem of underenforcement characterizes international law relating to
both labor and the environment.
Of course, one can make the argument that [P enforcement impedes rather
than expands international trade. This argument rejects the analogy of EP rights
to traditional property rights and instead likens IP rights to monopoly rights.2°
As monopoly rights, [P rights tend to exclude poor countries from production
and therefore impede global competition in [P-related goods and services.
Because the monopoly keeps prices high, world demand and therefore world
203. WTO Agreement, supra note 44, at 25 ("The extent of protection and enforcement of
[IP] rights varied widely around the world; and as IP became more important in trade, these
differences became a source of tension in international economic relations."). But see David
Silverstein, Intellectual Property Rights. Trading Patterns and Practices, Development and
Standards of Living: A North-South Perspective on Patent Law Harmonization, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, at 155-56 (arguing that U.S. efforts to
spread Western IP laws as a way to harmonize global IP laws will fail, whereas a "culturally-
specific" system would address economic and social conditions of each country).
204. Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, International Trade and Intellectual
Property: Promise. Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285, 296 (1989) ("The key
to a strong international intellectual property system within the GAIT is... a strong dispute
resolution mechanism.").
205. But see Merges, supra note 200, at 241 (noting, by contrast, that "[tihere is little
potential for horsetrading in the WIPO context").
206. See Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual
Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 769, 771
(1997) ("There is an inherent conflict.., between the free circulation of goods and services
across countries' borders and the exclusive right of intellectual property owners to explore their
creation at the exclusion of others, thus restricting the free circulation of goods and services
within the common market."); see also Paul S. Grunzweig, Note, Prohibiting the Presumption
of Market Power for Intellectual Property Rights: The Intellectual Property Antitrust
Protection Act of 1989, 16 J. CORP. L. 103, 103-04 (1990) (noting that "[a]t their core, the
policies that drive the patent laws and the antitrust laws of the United States always will
conflict").
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trade in these sectors remains lower than they would be with greater
competition.2 o7
In fact, there is a real rift in perspective that reflects the North-South
divide, with the North, particularly the United States, pushing to include IP
rights in the WTO, and the South losing faith in the entire system.2 °8 Despite
this divide, the view of IP protection as a facilitator rather than an inhibitor of
international trade prevailed, culminating in the TRIPs agreement.209 When
viewed as a facilitator of international trade, the logic for including
international IP law becomes clear: to further the central objectives of the
GATT/WTO system. By the same token, the logic for excluding international
labor and environmental law also emerges. As standards that seek to restrain
international trade, they would be anathema to the stated objectives of the
system.
Considerable research shows that the interests of trade need not run
contrary to labor and environmental protection. Recently, the WTO Committee
on Trade and Environment commissioned a study on whether environmental
regulations impose costs on production that tend to increase prices and thereby
decrease trade volume. The resulting report found that, although environmental
207. See, e.g., Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 163-64, 183 (1999) (suggesting that the push for heightened
IP protection focuses too much on domestic concerns and largely ignores global economic
effects, including disincentives to buy protected products).
208. See, e.g., Horacio Teran, Intellectual Property Protection and Offshore Software
Development: An Analysis ofthe U.S. Software Industry, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1,58-59
(2001) (concluding that Westerners' long term exploitation of indigenous knowledge and
resources has reduced the confidence of indigenous peoples in the Western system of IP); Jan
D'Alessandro, Note, A Trade-Based Response to Intellectual Property Piracy: A Comprehensive
Plan to Aid the Motion Picture Industry, 76 GEo. L.J. 417, 452-54 (1987) (noting that the Reagan
administration engaged in "ongoing efforts" to add IP protection to the GAT and discussing
other countries' considerations regarding same); see also Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United
States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IowA L. REv. 273,282
(1991) (explaining that developing countries view ready access to IP as important to
development, and consider enforcing IP law a burden on development not warranting scarce
government funds); Joel R. Reidenberg, Trade, TRIPs and NAFTA, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 283, 283 (1993) ("While the expansion of intellectual property protection
around the world can be attributed to American trade pressure, the trade framework will
constrain any country's ability to take unilateral measures against infringements of intellectual
property rights.").
209. See Evelyn Su, The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries, 23 Hous. 1.
INT'L L. 169, 170-71 (2000) (noting the adoption of the TRIPs agreement at the 1994
Marrakesh summit and discussing the conflicting views of developed countries, which sought
international IP enforcement to reduce the billions of dollars lost annually to IP piracy, and
developing countries, which suffer potentially reduced access to. technology under TRIPs).
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protection increases production costs, its "competitiveness effect" is ultimately
minor.2t0 The report found that this minimal effect on competitiveness results,
in part, because environmental protection costs are likely offset by cost-saving
efficiency gains elsewhere in the production process.21 In addition, the report
found that, with some exceptions, environmental regulations are not of primary
importance in international investment decisions and that most industries do not
move from developed to developing countries to reduce their environmental
compliance costs.
212
B. The Article X Exception and the Legislative Response
Article XX, the General Exceptions provision of the GATT, contains a
clause allowing governments to take trade-restricting measures necessary to
enforce IP law.213 If the General Exceptions measure does provide all the
support necessary for governments to enforce trade-related measures that might
restrict imports, presumably no need to negotiate TRIPs would have arisen.
The TRIPs was negotiated, however, notwithstanding both a recognition of IP
protection in the GATT's General Exceptions provision and a well-developed
body of existing international law outside of the GATT. The fact that
negotiation occurred lends credence to the argument that some integration of
affirmative obligations to labor and environmental standards is required for
these standards' proper enforcement and that the current exceptions-driven
regime is inadequate.
Legislating affirmative IP obligations required confronting problems of
diffuseness and non-justiciability. At first blush, these problems seem much
less troublesome in international IP law. Enumerated procedures identify IP
rights owed to the right-holder, for example, the right to "prevent" others from
"making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing. 214 Every government
210. See HAKAN NORDSTROM & SCOTr VAUGHAN, WTO SPECIAL STUDY, TRADE AND
ENVIRONMENT 36-38 (1999) (concluding that "superior environmental performance" does not
always reduce profitability).
211. See id. at 51-52 (discussing the "tradeoff between production of goods and
environmental quality" that changes with increases in income level).
212. See id. at 41 (suggesting that environmental regulations are not of primary importance
in competitiveness and in location decisions).
213. See GAIT 1947, supra note 44, art. XX, Il(d),61 Stat. atA61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262
(allowing for trade-restrictive measures "necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those
relating to... the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights").
214. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 169, art. 28 ("Rights conferred"), I(a).
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who is a party to the agreement, which now includes all WTO members, owes
these rights."' The right generates entitlements to certain types of legal
protections-the right to deploy the state's enforcement power to exclude
others from using the IP to which the right attaches.
Hindsight should not obscure the fact that real difficulties of this sort arose
in the drafting of TRIPs, however. Although the Paris Convention 16 and the
Berne Convention 21 7 were paramount in international IP law, a number of other
international agreements developed. The Uniform Copyright Convention, for
example, was a parallel instrument to the Berne Convention.218 Moreover,
contracting parties put into force several versions of the Paris and Berne
conventions.219 As a result of these numerous agreements, states significantly
disagreed as to which international IP obligations were fundamental. For
example, European states tended to regard the "moral rights" of authors against
degradation of their work under the Berne Convention as fundamental, whereas
the United States did not.
220
215. The TRIPS Agreement is contained in Annex IX to the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization. Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization provides, "The agreements and associated legal instruments included in
Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter Multilateral Trade Agreements) are integral parts of this
Agreement binding on all Members." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 169, art. 11, 2.
216. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 13 U.S.T.
2, 828 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Paris Convention], as last revised at Stockholm, July 14,1967,
21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
217. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
168 Consol. T.S. 185 [hereinafter Berne Convention], as last revised at Paris, July 24,1971,25
U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
218. See Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, art. XVII, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1367,
943 U.N.T.S. 178, 205 (providing that states' withdrawal from the Berne Convention would
result in exclusion from the Convention's protections and that the provisions of the Convention
do not affect the Berne Convention).
219. Contracting parties to the Paris Convention, for example, were states that had adopted
one of the following: the Paris Convention, supra note 216, as revised at Stockholm, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; the Paris Convention, supra note 216, as revised at
Lisbon, Oct. 31, 1958, 53 Stat. 1748, 828 U.N.T.S. 107; the Paris Convention, supra note 216,
as revised at London, June 2, 1934, 53 Stat. 1788, 3 Bevans 223; or the Paris Convention, supra
note 216, as revised at The Hague, Nov. 6, 1925, 47 Stat. 1789, 2 Bevans 524. Contracting
parties to the Berne Convention, likewise, were states that adopted one of the following: the
Berne Convention, supra note 217, as revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828
U.N.T.S. 221; the Berne Convention, supra note 217, as revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967,
25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221; the Beme Convention, supra note 217, as revised at
Brussels, June 26, 1948, 831 U.N.T.S. 217; the Beme Convention, supra note 217, as revised at
Rome, June 2, 1928, 123 L.N.T.S. 233; or the Berne Convention, supra note 217, as revised at
Berlin, Nov. 13, 1908, 1 L.N.T.S. 217.
220. See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 145-46 (2000) (describing the clear disdain that the United States held
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In addition to the issue of uniformity of principles, serious problems arose
because the vagueness of the principles allowed for substantial variation across
countries. 2 1 For example, although the Paris Convention established the basic
principle of patent protection, it allowed for much more variation among
member states than the specific obligations imposed by TRIPs.222 Indeed, the
frustration of the United States at the lack of uniformity of IP protection abroad
provided a major incentive for its pursuit of IP negotiations in the trade
223regime. Moreover, awareness of the lack of uniformity of protections was
acute in the context of the TRIPs negotiations; the primary achievement of the
negotiations was to resolve these differences and arrive at a single set of"core"
substantive standards. 24
A final distinction departs from any appeal to structural or substantive
logic, but appeals purely to pragmatic considerations. Particularly in the wake
of the WTO's newfound institutional rigor, many commentators worry about
the increased likelihood that the international trade regime will reach a
"breaking point."22s The new WTO sets much loftier ambitions for institution-
building than did the old GATT. 226 Commentators worry that, while the GATT
towards adopting the European moral rights regime).
221. See Robert J. Gutowski, Comment, The Marriage of Intellectual Property and
International Trade in the TRIPs Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in
Heaven?, 47 BUF. L. REv. 713,724 (1999) ("The stark distinction between South Africa's and
Peru's application of the well-known mark requirement of Article 6 is of the Paris Convention
(described in this Article] highlights the problems of the Paris-Berne regime: lack of
harmonization, disparate national treatment, and deficient enforcement and dispute resolution
provisions.").
222. See Merges, supra note 200, at 242 ("The proposed GATT intellectual property code,
which attempts to provide more substantive guidelines, has met with stiffopposition from some
members of the Paris Convention, in part because of its specificity on certain matters (e.g.,
pharmaceutical patents).").
223. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing the priority that the United
States placed on IP issues).
224. See Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 204, at 291 (observing that "[c]reating norms
and standards for intellectual property would be the most important and difficult area" of
upcoming TRIPs negotiations); Joel R. Reidenberg, Trade TRIPS and NAFTA, 4 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 283, 285 (1993) (citing as problems with TRIPS that
"traditional rights now being enshrined in TRIPS are also at odds with emerging national
trends" and that "[n]ew technologies do not fit neatly within traditional forms of intellectual
property").
225. See Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of
the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 14 (1999) (anticipating that, because
international legal systems depend on voluntary member government compliance, the WTO
legal system cannot expect unanimous governmental compliance with its legal rulings).
226. See id. at 3-4 (noting the boldness of the WTO dispute settlement initiative and the
legal rigor of new procedures).
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was flexible and therefore never broke, the WTO may be overly rigid and
overshoot the mark in seeking to establish a "legalistic" regime.227 The result
might be a backlash of states that would erode the precious legitimacy that the
global regime has built up over the postwar era.228
The jury is still out as to whether the WTO is institutionally viable over
the long run. The dispute settlement system garnered early acclaim by
resolving contentious issues between powerful members with relative
success.229  The first new agreement-making meeting in Singapore went
relatively smoothly and succeeded in making anticipated gains. 230 However,
the highly visible failure of the next ministerial conference in Seattle revived
the old institutional concerns. 23' The Seattle experience demonstrated that state
sovereignty still had bite, that is, if the member states desired, they could refuse
to adhere to the built-in agenda, impeding the progressive development of the
institution.232 Thus, the anticipated progress in negotiations on services,
agriculture, and other areas failed to materialize.233
227. See id. at 12 (displaying skepticism that member countries will be receptive to greater
legal discipline in the WTO system); Miquel Montafli i Mora, A GA TTwith Teeth: Law Wins
over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
103, 178 (explaining that some scholars have observed a preference for informalism in
international economic law and observing that this preference explains the law's reluctance to
employ rigid mechanisms).
228. See, e.g., MontafIl i Mora, supra note 227, at 151-53 (voicing concerns about the
WTO appellate review system: the lack of conditions for admissibility of appeals, the difficulty
in agreeing on a review tribunal's composition, the shift towards legalism, the appellate body's
probable approach towards interpretation, and the existence of individual opinions in the reports
of the appellate body).
229. See, e.g., Hudec, supra note 225, at 14 (suggesting that the first three years of the
WTO and its dispute settlement system were a "considerable initial success").
230. See Success in Singapore, WTO Focus (World Trade Org., Geneva, Switz.), Jan.
1997, at I, I (reporting Chairman Yeo Cheow Tong's view that the negotiators "have
delivered,... [and] have accomplished the task set upon us"), available at http://www.wto.
orglenglish/rese/focuse/focus I 5e.pdf.
231. See John H. Jackson, The Perils OfGlobalization and the World Trading System, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 371, 375 (2000) (focusing on the "institutional" causes for the "failure of
Seattle"); cf Timothy M. Reif & Viji Rangaswarni, Joltin' Joe Has Left and Gone Away-
Embracing Change: The Way Forwardfor U.S. Trade Policy and the WTO, 32 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 427,437-46 (2001) (arguing that the Seattle debacle occurred because institutional
reform of the WTO has not gone far enough in increasing public input, heightening sensitivity
to fairness, and implementing legislative processes).
232. See Joseph Kahn, Swiss Forum Has Its Focus on Memoriesfrom Seattle, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2000, at CI (noting that "government officials have stressed that the failure of trade
talks owes more to negotiating positions taken by World Trade Organization members than to
the influence of demonstrators").
233. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO: Diplomats Say Seattle Scars Too Tender to Permit Big
Push for WTO Trade Round, BNA INT'L TRADE NEWs DAILY, Dec. 15, 1999 (noting that the
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Particularly in the wake of Seattle, one might argue that at some point
institutional modesty is required: The addition of items to the negotiation
agenda would be too taxing. There may be some validity to this perception. It
does not justify, however, the special exclusion of labor and environmental
concerns, as opposed to other issues that are placed on the agenda. For
example, negotiations on competition policy would require reconciling many
different and complex regulatory regimes, but WTO members continue to
consider the possibility of framing an agreement on competition. At the
conclusion of their 1996 meeting in Singapore, WTO members agreed to
"establish a working group to study issues... relating to the interaction
between trade and competition policy. . in order to identify any areas that may
merit further consideration in the WTO framework. ' 234 Controversy and
disagreement continue to run high over the matter, and formal efforts to frame
an agreement have not begun.235
In reviewing these political dynamics, one might notice that developing
countries' interests, at least as commonly construed in this particular debate,236
run counter to IP protection as well as to labor and environmental concerns. At
the time of the Uruguay Round negotiations, many developing countries
staunchly opposed the incorporation of [P rights. The argument sounded quite
similar to those made in the context of labor and environmental debates.
Developing countries argued that the administration of [P rights properly
belonged to the United Nations organization traditionally charged with that
duty, the Wpo.
2 3 7
breakdown of talks in Seattle preventing WTO members from fulfilling their commitment made
"at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994 to begin new negotiations on agriculture and services
by 2000"); see also Daniel Pruzin, WTO: Moore Outlines Incremental Approach Towards New
Round of WTO Talks, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 3, 2000 (describing collapse of a
meeting after the members could not resolve differences over the framework and objectives for
agriculture talks, refusal of the United States to consider new negotiations on antidumping rules,
and the inclusion of labor standards on the WTO's work agenda).
234. Ministerial Conference, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, 120, WT/MIN(96)/DEC
(Dec. 18, 1996), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 220, 226 (1997), available at http://www.wto.org.
235. See WTO: Trade Officials Seek Doha Breakthrough, but Few Changes Occur in
WTO Stances, INTERNATIONAL TRADE DAILY, June 7,2001 (stating that thirty-five to forty of the
WTO's 141 members support negotiations on competition, with support strongest among
Europe and Latin America and with opposition strongest from the United States, among others).
236. Of course, there are many reasons to believe that poor countries, or at least significant
populations therein, stand to benefit from such protections.
237. Indian Proposal Says Developing Countries Should Get Patent, Trademark
Concessions, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 953, 953 (July 19, 1989) (reporting that Third World
countries, led by Brazil and India, argued that IP "should be dealt with by the World Intellectual
Property Organization" rather than be included in GAT').
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General opposition to [P standards in developing countries resulted not in
an absolute opposition to their incorporation, but rather in a quid pro quo
approach. 238  Having reconciled themselves to the need to establish a
comprehensive trade regime, many developing countries sought to leverage
their willingness to countenance IP negotiations for the purpose of including
negotiations on sectors of interest to them. Textiles and agriculture were two
such notable sectors. 239 Trade groups in the United States, which had an
interest in maintaining the status quo of high protectionist barriers to imports,
staunchly opposed negotiations on both of these topics.
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Were labor or environmental negotiations to begin, the quid pro quo
approach would undoubtedly re-emerge. That is, if industrialized countries
wanted better labor and environmental practices in poor countries, the
industrialized countries would have to agree, at least partially, to fund the
process of acquiring those practices. This approach has been a staple of recent
international environmental law, in which the principle of environmental
protection is now wedded to the goal of development in poor countries. 4I
Many environmental agreements include provisions for technology transfer and
funding mechanisms to aid developing countries in compliance efforts.242
238. See Chantal Thomas, Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing World:
Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic Order, 15 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 1249, 1260-61 (2000) (discussing political trends leading to a deferential approach by
industrialized countries toward Third World nations in applying GATr with cognizance of
political issues facing those states).
239. See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 44,
Annex I A, [Treaties Binder I, Treaties Booklet I ], L. & Prac. World Trade Org. (Oceana) 27,
27 (Mar. 1995) (calling on developed countries to take into account the "particular needs and
conditions" of developing countries in increasing markets for their agricultural products);
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 44, Annex
IA [Treaties Binder 1, Treaties Booklet I ], L. & Prac. World Trade Org. (Oceana) 77, 77 (Mar.
1995) (recalling agreement that "special treatment should be accorded to the least-developed
countr[ies]").
240. See Edmund W. Sim, Derailing The Fast- Track For International Trade Agreements,
5 FLA. INT'L L.J. 471,484-85 (1990) (noting that "[e]mbittered textile lobbyists threatened to
'do whatever is necessary"' to forestall concessions on textiles, and that some agricultural
interests were "implacable opponents of the Uruguay Round," although other agricultural
sectors such as grain and oil seed exporters supported trade negotiations in the hopes of
increasing their overseas market share).
241. See Weiss, supra note 33, at 814-15 (outlining areas of concern and priorities relating
to sustainable development and implementing economic progress while using resources in clean
and efficient manner).
242. See, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra note 38, arts. 10, 13, 26 I.L.M at 1557, 1559
(discussing the funding and technical assistance mechanisms in Articles 10 and 13,
respectively). Under Article 10, "[t]he parties shall, . . . taking into account in particular the
needs of developing counties, co-operate in promoting technical assistance to facilitate
participation in and implementation of this protocol." Id. at 1557. Article 13 provides that
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Developing countries' resistance to linkage will likely continue as long as
proponents of the trade-labor/environment linkage fail to construct cost-sharing
arrangements, as in the case of labor regulations, or construct only partial
arrangements, as in the case of environmental regulations. However, it is
important to note that in many cases integrating trade, labor, and environmental
regulations would impose no new obligations on member states. Particularly
with respect to the most salient international agreements on labor and the
environment, most rich and poor countries have reached agreement.2 43 The fact
that poor countries have already assumed these obligations seems to neutralize
any legitimate protest on their part to integrating into a regime that might
provide more effective enforcement. 244 As Jose Alvarez has argued, state
accession to international law instruments is often conditional precisely on their
relatively weak enforceability and the relatively high residual state autonomy to
determine compliance.245
V Conclusion
On reflection, this debate between the judicial and legislative responses to
incorporation at an international level seems to parallel a tension between
competing attributes of legitimacy in decisionmaking within domestic legal
systems: expertise and independence on the one hand, versus accountability
and representativeness on the other. Although the legislative response to
linkage is politically more desirable, it appears to be less plausible. Judicial
"[tihe funds required for the operation of this Protocol ... shall be charged exclusively against
contributions from the Parties." Id. at 1559.
243. See International Labour Organization, International Labour Standards Ratifications,
at http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/ (listing current status of labor
agreement ratification); see also United Nations Environment Programme, Environmental
Conventions, at http://www.unep.org/SEC/env3.htm (listing current status of environmental
convention ratification).
244. Summers, supra note 102, at 67. Summers argues that:
It is ironic that Egypt, Brazil, Indonesia and Pakistan, which were among those
most vocal in opposing the [proposal to incorporate labor discussions into WTO
talks in Seattle] have ratified conventions on all of these subjects, with the
exception of Pakistan's failure to ratify a convention on child labor. They
expressed outrage that [President] Clinton would suggest [in his proposal on labor]
that they should be required to observe the conventions that they had ratified.
Id. (citation omitted).
245. See Jose E. Alvarez, How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded
Trade Regime, 7 WIDENER L. SyMp. J. 1, 1 (2001) (noting that the WTO is rare among
international law regimes because it usually "secures at least procedural (if not always
substantive) compliance").
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response may represent the best option, particularly at an early stage.
Moreover, judicial response might have an "action-forcing" effect, in which the
relative benefit of codification through legislation increases over time to correct
any deficiencies in the rules established by the legislature. However,
potentially prohibitive decision costs might reduce overall welfare by barring
collective action, resulting in the continuation of a rule that does not represent
the aggregate preferences of the members and their respective constituencies.
On either side, however, the purported virtues can be seen as vices: One
can regard the expertise of thejudiciary as "insider" bias, and the accountability
of the legislature is susceptible to capture. Even more complexly, recently
these charges of insider bias and capture have sometimes strayed outside their
traditional realms: Critics have charged the WTO judiciary with capture and
the representatives of member states with insider bias. As the "Development
Round" of WTO negotiations moves forward, the international debate on
integrating trade, labor, and environmental law must determine not only the
appropriate substance and form of the rule, but also the appropriate
decisionmaking institution and process.
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